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1Executive summary
The English Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) are tasked with the challenge
of encouraging sustainable development in their regions, with the ultimate aim of
achieving high levels of social and economic well-being within environmental limits.
Measuring progress towards that vision is no simple matter.
Recognising this, a consortium of RDAs led by that for the East Midlands (emda)
commissioned nef (the new economics foundation) to construct an adjusted
economic measure based on the framework piloted previously for East Midlands and
some other English regions. This framework, in turn, is based on a range of attempts
to construct an adjusted measure of GDP – the Index of Sustainable Economic
Welfare (ISEW) – at the national level.
This report describes the development and application of a Regional Index of
Sustainable Economic Well-Being (R-ISEW), and calculates it for all English regions.
The results for England as a whole (Figure 1) reveal that, during the period of the
study, the R-ISEW rose by approximately 44%, from £7,400 per capita in 1994 to
£10,700 per capita in 2005. Meanwhile, the Gross Value Added (GVA) was
considerably higher throughout the period, growing (by 31%) from just under £14,000
per capita in 1994 to just over £18,000 per capita in 2005.
In absolute terms, the growth in R-ISEW still lags behind the growth in GVA. The
difference between R-ISEW per capita and GVA per capita increases from just under
£6,500 in 1994 to over £7,400 in 2005. It is concluded that the gap between
conventional economic output and sustainable economic well-being is still widening.
The rising trend in R-ISEW over the period is driven primarily by strong growth in
consumption, increased public expenditure on health and education, and significant
reduction in air pollution. The most important countervailing forces (tending to keep
the R-ISEW depressed well below GVA) are the costs associated with resource
depletion, the growing impact of income inequality, and the costs of failing to provide
for long-term environmental damage from climate change.
Within the overall picture there are some significant regional differences. Some
regions do significantly better than others in terms of R-ISEW. Figure 2 illustrates the
range of results found in this study. The region with the highest R-ISEW (in 2004)
was the South West, while the region with the lowest R-ISEW was Yorkshire and the
Humber. The gap between R-ISEW and GVA also varies widely between regions.
London and the South East exhibit the largest gap between R-ISEW and the
conventional measure, while the North West and the South West show the smallest.
The fastest growing gaps are in the South East and West Midlands, growing at 35%
and 36% respectively.
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Figure 1: The English R-ISEW 1994–2005, plotted against GVA.
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Figure 2: Regional Variations in R-ISEW per capita.
Variations across regions are, of course, determined by all the components of the R-
ISEW. The key explanatory factors, however, were found to be the difference
between GVA and inequality adjusted consumer expenditure, net international
position, the costs of resource depletion, long-term environmental damage, air
3pollution and commuting, and the uneven distribution of public expenditure on health
and education.
Interestingly, this study also found that regional disparities1 in R-ISEW are declining
(Figure 3), in spite of increasing disparities in GVA and consumer expenditure,
suggesting that, overall, environmental and social trends are tending to ‘equalise’ the
English regions. Importantly, however, this equalisation is not always in a positive
sense. Some regions with lower environmental costs a decade ago are now
becoming less sustainable in certain ways.
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Figure 3: Regional Variation in R-ISEW compared against GVA.
Even at national level, constructing adjusted economic indicators of progress is a
formidable task. At regional level, the task is compounded by limitations in the
availability of regional data, although this is improving all the time. As more and
better data become available, and as new revisions of the ISEW are developed in
other countries and regions, the theory and practice behind the R-ISEW evolves.
The results reported here should still be viewed as a ‘best estimate’ at the present
time, to be refined and revised in future iterations. Indeed, a comparison between this
version of the R-ISEW and those calculated previously for some English regions will
show some, not-insignificant changes. Subject to these inevitable caveats, we submit
that the R-ISEW represents a valuable step in meeting the requirement for robust
tools for measuring progress towards the long-term vision of sustainability.
Overall, the results of this exercise suggest that there is little room for complacency
in any region. The R-ISEWs are all much lower than GVA in absolute terms and
during the last few years the absolute gap between GVA and R-ISEW has tended to
widen. Sensitivity analyses reveal that on less optimistic assumptions, this gap could
be wider still. A robust effort to tackle income inequality, climate change and resource
depletion will be necessary if the long-term vision of sustainable economic well-being
is to be achieved across the English Regions.
41. Introduction
‘Government Offices aim to use their policies, programmes and influence to
enable their regions and localities to become better communities in which to
live through the effective alignment of national, regional and local priorities.’2
There is a growing impetus behind the search for better ways of measuring ‘progress’
than simple economic indicators based on market transactions: in the twenty-first
century we know that ‘it's not just the economy, stupid.’ Over the last few decades,
industrialised countries have achieved unprecedented levels of prosperity and
material comfort, and are now taking stock of what all this wealth actually means, and
how it is related to underlying goals of personal and societal welfare. And, over the
same period, we have also developed a keener awareness of how dependent we are
on limited resources, of our impact on those resources, and that we need real
structural change if we are to make those resources last for more than the next
generation or two.
We know that we need to develop ‘sustainably’, that we need to take urgent action in
relation to climate change and pollution, that ‘hyper-consumption’ is not consistently
delivering personal happiness and may even be undermining social cohesion and
community. But where do we start to address these issues? How do we prioritise
these and other factors? What are the trade-offs between economic, environmental
and social goals and how do we weight them? How do we achieve ‘effective
alignment of national, regional and local priorities’ as the Government Offices aim to
do, when these priorities overlap, compete and are measured on incompatible axes?
The first step has to be to know what we are dealing with. When the issues of interest
and importance are so diverse, we need to establish a common and commensurable
basis for quantifying impacts. The R-ISEW is an adjusted economic indicator which
attempts to monetarise costs and benefits which are not traditionally measured in
monetary terms. It brings together a wide range of economic, social and
environmental issues into one analytic framework to allow fair comparisons between
them.
In recognition of the challenges of measuring progress, emda commissioned a ‘think-
piece’ from nef in late 2004 on the relationship between quality of life, well-being and
regional development.3 The report identified a number of different concepts of well-
being that might guide regional development and also suggested a number of
different approaches to the task of measuring regional progress in well-being.
Following discussions stimulated by that document, emda asked nef to develop a
pilot R-ISEW for the East Midlands. The objective was to develop an ‘adjusted’
measure of economic progress at the regional level, based substantially on attempts
to develop similar indicators at the national level in the UK and elsewhere. The R-
5ISEW was incorporated into the targeting and reporting structure of emda's Regional
Economic Strategy, and has since been applied in several other cases: the English
regions of the South East and Yorkshire and the Humber, Scotland, and as far afield
as Lombardy in Italy.4
Now for the first time, the R-ISEW is being calculated simultaneously for all the
English regions, which will enable regions to identify their relative strengths and
weaknesses in securing sustainable economic well-being for their communities, and
perhaps use this information to share successful strategies, or coordinate policy. The
resources devoted to this larger project, and the economies of scale gained by
researching and calculating all the regions together, have allowed us to review and
improve the methodology underpinning the results.
In Section 2 of this report, we summarise the theoretical issues involved in measuring
well-being and briefly outline Daly & Cobb’s ISEW and other ‘alternative’ indicators of
progress. Section 3 presents the results of the R-ISEW component by component,
setting out the key adjustments and describing the quantitative results and trends
over the period between 1994 and 2005. Section 4 explores inter-regional
differences, and concluding remarks can be found in Section 5.
Technical appendices provide further theoretical background, numerical results,
methodology, and a sensitivity analysis. Appendix 1 provides further detail on the
range of alternative indicators that have been considered, focussing on the historical
development of the ISEW. A summary of the R-ISEW in each region is given in
Appendix 2; Appendix 3 describes key changes to the methodology made in this
updated model of the R-ISEW; Appendix 4 gives a detailed description of the data
sources and methodology for each component; and Appendix 5 presents an analysis
of the impact of some key sensitivities.
62. Measuring well-being
2.1 The Problem with GDP
Rising GDP traditionally symbolises a thriving economy, more spending power,
increased family security, greater choice, richer and fuller lives, more public spending
and better public services. As a measure of progress, the GDP appears initially to
have much to recommend it. At the regional level in the UK, this function has in
recent years been taken over by GVA, a proxy for GDP at the regional level.
There are, however, a number of reasons to view with caution the simplistic equation
of national or regional income with well-being. Numerous authors have pointed to the
(sometimes rising) social and environmental costs associated with rising economic
output.5 Others have pointed to the potential divergence between material gains and
psychological or social well-being.6 At the very least, it is clear that there are a
number of factors – such as physical and mental health, family security,
environmental quality and social cohesion – which contribute to well-being, but which
are not captured by conventional measures of economic output at all.7
None of this has gone entirely unnoticed over the years, even by the original
proponents of the GDP. The economist Simon Kuznets – one of the architects of the
system of national accounts – declared that ‘the welfare of a nation can scarcely be
inferred from a measurement of the national income.’ Robert Kennedy famously
described Gross National Product with the following:
‘Gross National Product counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and
ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our
doors and the jails for the people who break them. It counts the destruction of
the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. . . . Yet the
gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the
quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty
of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public
debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor
our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor
our devotion to our country. It measures everything, in short, except that
which makes life worthwhile.’
Robert Kennedy, March 1968
The 1993 revision of the System of National Accounts (SNA) declared categorically
that ‘neither gross nor net domestic product is a measure of welfare’.8 In November
2007, the European Parliament hosted a conference entitled Beyond GDP, which set
7out to explore alternative approaches to measuring well-being.9 At this conference,
José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, declared:
‘It is not enough for us to talk about the different global challenges, as
energy, climate change, health, security and the environment. We
need widely accepted communication tools that show progress in
these fields. And that progress can only be measured with suitable
indicators. So it's time to go beyond the tools developed for the very
different world of the 1930s. (…) It's time to go beyond GDP.’ 10
Similarly, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, has stated:
‘Business as usual is not an option. We do not need more and more
resources and energy for a good life.’11
It is even possible to find criticism of the growth project in the nineteenth-century
writings of John Stuart Mill – one of the principal architects of classical economics.12
Concern over using GDP (or its regional proxy) as a measure of social well-being
confronts national and regional policy-makers with one fundamental question: how
exactly are we to assess our progress towards an improved quality of life? In terms
specific to the vision of the English Regions, how are we to measure progress
towards the goal of ‘better communities in which to live’?
2.2 Alternative measures
‘Alternative’ measurements of well-being have generally followed one of four quite
distinct approaches in attempting to answer this question.
The first of these has been to develop extended indicator sets, measuring a wide
variety of ‘objective’ physical or socio-economic factors which are deemed to
contribute to or detract from personal or collective well-being. For example, the most
recent SNA includes a detailed system of Integrated Economic and Environmental
Accounting (SEEA 2003) which brings together economic and environmental
information in a combined framework.13 In the UK, the Department of Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has brought together the Sustainable Development
Indicator set, which includes measures of pollution, consumption, objective well-
being (e.g. poverty levels, and life expectancy), and, as of 2007, subjective well-
being.14 Meanwhile, in 2009 the Audit Commission, based on work by the Young
Foundation and nef, will be advising local authorities across the UK on how to bring
together data from the new 198 national indicators to form a coherent picture of well-
being.
The disadvantage of these approaches, however, is their unwieldiness. How can
large sets of indicators be brought together meaningfully? There is no framework for
weighing up the inevitable trade-offs between different indicators. How can we make
balanced assessment of ‘overall progress’ on the basis of these data?
The remaining three approaches all attempt to provide a framework for doing just
this. They may be based on sets of individual indicators, which can be assessed
separately. However, they make the bold step of trying to combine the indicators to
provide headline indicators of some form.
Standard composite indicators typically use atheoretical methodologies for bringing
together a set of well-being indicators into a single index. Perhaps the best known
example of this is the United Nations Development Programme’s Human
8Development Index (HDI).15,16 The HDI is composed of three elements: GDP per
capita, life expectancy at birth, and education levels, assessed in terms of literacy
and school enrolment rates.17 The three elements are normalised and brought
together so that the overall HDI represents an average of performance on each one.
Reported annually for 177 countries, the HDI has been very successful in raising the
level of debate about the relationship between income growth and well-being. Other
measures are more complex. For example, the Italian Regional Quality of
Development Index (QUARS) brings together 45 variables in 7 domains.18
A more radical approach has been to recognise the problems in attempting to
quantify the relative importance of different environmental, economic and social
factors in determining well-being, and focus instead on attempting to measure well-
being itself, through self-report. The most direct approach is to ask a single question
on happiness or ‘life satisfaction’. For example, Defra’s headline indicator for well-
being is a single question:
‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole
nowadays?’19
On its own, however, a single question such as this has little use for policy-makers.
Obviously, no single figure can offer fine-grained information or recommend specific
policies. There is no immediately apparent ‘theory of change’ at hand when low
levels of life satisfaction are found. Secondly, whilst life satisfaction does appear to
correlate with interesting measures at the individual level, there is evidence that it
lacks sensitivity when taken at the aggregate national level.20,21,22 In other words, we
may find that overall life satisfaction does not respond to policy changes in a useful
manner. Given these problems, nef has begun exploring more textured measures of
subjective well-being. For example, the Caerphilly Sustainability Index survey has
recently been developed, which includes questions on not just hedonic well-being,
but also the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonic23 well-being. Meanwhile the
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions runs a
European Quality of Life Survey which brings together data to explore levels of
‘deficit’ across Europe. Four types of deficit are considered – having deficits, loving
deficits, being deficits and time deficits.24 Both these approaches have the potential
to provide policy-makers with more textured information on well-being. As with
objective indicators, however, the problem of aggregation remains – for example
does reducing ‘having deficits’ justify an increase in ‘loving deficits’?
The fourth approach which we shall consider here attempts to deal with aggregation
issues by converting all components into a single unit – currency. By converting
social and environmental costs and benefits into a common unit, this approach allows
trade-offs to be calculated transparently, and in a format that policy makers and
economists are already familiar with.
2.3 The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW)
The ISEW, is the best-known example of this approach. It starts from the premise
that consumer expenditure is, all things being equal, an acceptable proxy for
economic welfare. However, it incorporates several adjustments that attempt to deal
with the criticisms faced by GDP and standard economic measures. The original
ISEW developed by Daly & Cobb (1989)25 follows the following algorithm:
 First, total personal consumption is adjusted to account for the reductions in
welfare associated with inequalities in the distribution of incomes.26
9 Secondly, an account is made of the non-monetarised contributions to welfare
from services provided by household labour.27
 Thirdly, account is taken of the environmental costs arising from the annual
emission of certain types of air and water pollution and noise pollution.
 Fourthly, account is taken of certain ‘defensive’ expenditures: specifically
private expenditures on health, education, commuting and car accidents are
subtracted from the account, and government expenditures are included in
the index only to the extent that they are regarded as non-defensive.28
 Next, the index makes several adjustments to account for changes in the
sustainability of the capital base. Specifically, it includes a ‘net capital growth’
adjustment to account for changes in the stock of human-made capital.29 It
also includes the net transactions in overseas assets and liabilities in order to
provide an indication of the robustness (and sustainability) of the economy in
international terms.30
 In addition, the index attempts to account for the difference between annual
expenditure on consumer durables and the services flowing in each year from
the stock of those goods.
 Finally, the index attempts to account for the depreciation of natural capital as
a result of the depletion of natural resources, the loss of habitats and the
accumulation of environmental damage from economic activity.
Taken together the adjustments which comprise the Daly and Cobb ISEW can be
expressed in the following equation:31
ISEW = Personal consumer expenditure
- adjustment for income inequality
+ public expenditures (deemed non-defensive)
+ value of domestic labour
+ economic adjustments
- defensive private expenditures
- costs of environmental degradation
- depreciation of natural capital.
The results of applying this methodology to the United States revealed a trend in
sustainable economic welfare which differed markedly from the trend in GDP over
the period examined (1950–1990). While GDP in the United States increased
substantially over the period, the ISEW began to level out, and even decline slightly
from about the mid-1970s onwards (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: US Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) 1950–1990.32
In 2004, nef published an updated ISEW variant for the UK, re-branded as a
Measure of Domestic Progress – MDP33,34 (Figure 5). The results followed a similar
pattern, with the ISEW remaining relatively static over a 50-year period.
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Figure 5: MDP and GDP per capita in the UK 1950–2002.
ISEWs (and Genuine Progress Indicators – which follow the same approach) have
been calculated for several other rich OECD nations now, including Australia,35
Austria,36 Belgium,37 Germany,38 Italy,39 the Netherlands40 and Sweden.41 The ISEW
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for Chile appears to be the first case of the methodology being taken outside this
group,42 and an ISEW for Thailand has also been estimated.43
For further reviews of ISEWs across the world see Niccolucci et al. (2006) and
Pulselli et al. (2008).44,45 Also see Lawn (2003) for a theoretical exploration of the
ISEW.46
2.4 Regionalisation
Several isolated examples of sub-national ISEWs have been calculated, including for
Alberta, Canada,47 parts of Vermont State in the USA,48 the Province of Siena in
Italy,49 and, most recently, four cities in China.50 Often, these have had to rely
heavily on approximate scaling-down from national datasets due to the difficulties in
sourcing suitable regional data.
In the UK, ISEWs have also been calculated for Wales and Scotland.51,52 It is,
however, the establishment of the Government Offices for the English Regions,
along with RDAs and Regional Observatories, that has really spurred a rapid
improvement in the quantity and quality of regional data available. While it is still not
possible to construct regional ISEWs (R-ISEWs) which stretch back to much before
the mid-1990s, we can now produce quite robust R-ISEWs for the last decade or so.
The first work in this field was carried out by nef for emda in 2006,53 and the
methodology has since been applied to four other English regions, as well as taking it
back to country-level for Scotland.54 All of these indices used a new approach to the
costs of climate change which attempts to strike a balance between the two methods
generally used (and bitterly debated). Wales also saw a new ISEW in 2007, though
this did not adopt the nef model in its entirety.55
This report takes the nef R-ISEW model and updates it slightly to accommodate
some of the shifts in the landscape of regional data availability, as well as criticisms
of and suggested improvements in methodology. For instance, it incorporates some
new factors, such as the cost of industrial accidents and pollution abatement costs
(in addition to the environmental costs previously counted); and drops the less robust
‘personal pollution control’ costs. It also refines the calculations of several factors,
such as noise pollution, commuting, resource depletion and climate change.
The overall effect on the index is not huge; rather these changes represent a
consolidation of R-ISEW theory and practice. In calculating an R-ISEW for all the
English regions on exactly the same basis, this work allows like-for-like comparison
between regions for the first time. It is hoped that this will help pave the way for wider
acceptance and uptake of a standardised R-ISEW model across the UK and
beyond.56
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3. The English R-ISEW – by component
The idea behind adjusted measures of economic well-being is to start from an
account of economic consumption (as for GDP). This basis is then adjusted to
incorporate various economic, social or environmental factors which are not included
in the conventional measure. In the following sections we discuss key findings and
trends over time in each of the component factors of the English Regions R-ISEW, as
calculated for the period 1994–2005.
A full discussion of all the results for all regions is beyond the scope of this report;
instead we present the range of results in each component, citing the regions with
the highest and lowest figures in each, and the headline results for England as a
whole. We also note any interesting results – for example where two regions which
are similar in some respects see a large difference in others. In Section 4 we explore
differences between regions in terms of the overall ISEW in further detail.
Regions which have had previous R-ISEWs calculated for them will notice that the
results given here are not simply an extension of the previous R-ISEW from 2004 to
2005. This is partly due to methodological changes, but also due to changes in the
underlying datasets. Some datasets used in the R-ISEW calculations are subject to
annual revisions, and these revisions filter through to many R-ISEW components. A
full impact analysis of methodological changes is given in Appendix 3.
In this section, we provide short descriptions of each component – more detailed
descriptions are provided in Appendix 4.
3.1 Economic factors
The baseline or starting point of the R-ISEW is regional consumer expenditure. This
is imperfect as a proxy for well-being for a number of reasons, but it at least provides
an indication of the value of goods and services consumed and is therefore a
reasonable estimate of the ‘standard of living’ during the period. From this basis, the
R-ISEW makes several economic adjustments to account for factors which are vital
to the long-term sustainability of the regional economy.
Consumer expenditure
Household final consumption expenditure. National figures from the ONS Blue Book,
which is based primarily on information from retailers. Regional figures derived using
data from the Expenditure and Food Survey.
Regional consumer expenditure across the regions grew by an average of 38% in
real terms over the period 1994–2005, from £470 billion in 1994 (total expenditure in
all regions) to £650 billion in 2005, while GVA increased by an average of 34% from
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£668 billion to £913 billion. As might be expected, there is considerable disparity
between the regions: consumer expenditure per capita in the North East was £8,186
in 1994, compared to £11,172 in London. In 2005, the North East figure was up 31%
to £10,755. London's increased by 24% to £13,864, but was overtaken by the South
East's growth of 35% to £14,791. The East of England, meanwhile, added a full 50%
to baseline expenditure, growing from £9,145 to £13,749. Interestingly, this surge in
the East is not matched by a corresponding increase in GVA: this grew only 28%
from £14,788 per capita to £18,931.
Net capital growth
Growth in capital stocks net of labour force growth.
The net effect of this adjustment can vary substantially, depending on the balance
between capital investment and workforce growth in the region. Overall, England saw
a 57% rise in net capital growth from £8.5 billion in 1994 to £13.3 billion in 2005. This
was driven by large rises in some regions such as Yorkshire and the Humber (up
£3.6 billion to £6.2 billion in 2005), and the North West (up £2.5 billion to £4.5 billion).
The South West also turned a £1.2 billion deficit into a modest surplus of £493 million
by 2005. These gains were offset by large decreases in other regions, notably
London (down £3.3 billion to minus £5 billion) and the North East (down £1.3 billion
to minus £1.5 billion).
Note that a negative figure here does not necessarily mean a net loss of capital
stocks, but that the growth in stocks did not keep pace with the growth in the
workforce (see Appendix 3 for details of this component of the methodology). In both
the cases above however, net capital expenditure did fall over the period, at the
same time as the workforce increased.
Net international position
For a nation, this is the balance of payments, adding exports and income, subtracting
imports, and adjusting for current account transfers. Regional estimates determined
using a combination of regional trade data, consumer expenditure on services, and
GVA.
The overall balance of payments for England improved by around 18% from a deficit
of £37.8 billion in 1994 to £31.1 billion in 2005. But as with capital growth, this
modest change masks strong regional variations: London reduced its £22.2-billion
deficit in 1994 to just £2.7 billion by 2005, while the West Midlands went from a £2.4
billion surplus into a deficit of £2.3 billion over the same period. The East of England
and the South East started the period in the red, and both saw their deficits grow
further (by £5.9 billion and £5.1 billion respectively). Meanwhile, the East Midlands
started with a small deficit and went into a healthy £3.3 billion surplus. The North
West, leading the table in 1994 with a £3.5-billion surplus, had lost almost £2 billion
of this by 2005.
Adjustment for consumer durables
The baseline consumer expenditure figures include all expenditure on consumer
durables; in welfare-theoretic terms this has been criticised for failing to treat
durables as household capital. The purchase of durable goods such as washing
machines provides a household with a flow of valuable services for some years. To
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adjust for this, we estimate the difference between expenditure on and the service
flow from consumer durables, accounting for depreciation and obsolescence.
No rigorous accounts of the stock of consumer durables exist for the UK, and such
estimates of both stock and service flow which do exist have not been updated for
some years now. We have used a generally accepted method to estimate stocks and
flows from the annual expenditure on consumer durables. This turns out to be a net
negative adjustment to the index which varies between 1.2% and 3.6% of total
consumer expenditure over the period.
As this component is driven by consumer expenditure on durables over the period,
one would expect it to follow trends in consumer expenditure as a whole. Indeed, this
is largely what we see: the North East and Yorkshire have the smallest adjustments
here, while London and the South East see larger ones; and the East of England
shows a sharp increase in the adjustment from minus £613 millio in 1994 to minus
£2.2 billion in 2005. Deviations from the consumer expenditure trends would
represent a shift in purchasing patterns between durables and non-durables. This
happens to some extent in the North West and in London, where spending on
durables as a proportion of all spending has increased; and in the East Midlands,
where this proportion has fallen over the period.
Effect of economic adjustments
It is now possible to calculate the impact of all three of the ‘economic’ adjustments to
the base indicator of consumer expenditure. The result is shown in Figure 6 on a per
capita basis to allow meaningful comparison between regions and against the
English average.
At this stage of construction – before social and environmental factors are accounted
for – the indicator shows the South West enjoying the strongest performance in 2005,
and the West Midlands suffering the weakest performance.
The net impact on England as a whole is a fairly consistent reduction of around 5–7%
of the baseline consumer expenditure, but as the preceding sections will have made
clear, the distribution across regions and over time is far from uniform. In some
regions (North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, and the East Midlands),
the net impact is generally positive, pushing the adjusted indicator above consumer
expenditure at this stage of construction. Over time, the size of the adjustment in
these regions varies: the North East's £1,023 per capita increase is whittled down to
just £35 by 2005, whereas Yorkshire and the Humber turns a small negative
adjustment of £97 into a positive £742.
In most other regions, the net impact is generally negative, except for the West
Midlands, where the adjustment shifts from a £400 boost in 1994 to a £720 decrease
in 2005. The South East keeps a fairly constant adjustment of minus 16–19%
(around £2,000–£2,500); London reduces the net impact from minus £2,812 to just
under £1,359 over the period; while the East of England's reduction of £930 per
capita is increased to £2,130.
Although there is no reason why this should necessarily be so, it is interesting to note
that after these adjustments, the regional disparities across England are reduced
from around 30% of average consumer expenditure57 to around 20% of the mean
adjusted index, in per capita terms.
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Figure 6: Economic adjustments on consumer expenditure per capita.
3.2 Social factors
In line with previous measures, the English Regions R-ISEW incorporates several
adjustments to account for social aspects of the economy which are vital to
sustainability, but which would normally be excluded from conventional economic
accounts. Two of these adjustments are positive ones. The first positive adjustment
accounts for the services to the economy provided by unpaid labour from households
and volunteers. The second accounts for public expenditures on health and
education. We then account for some social costs: crime, divorce, commuting and
accidents on the road and in the workplace.
Services from domestic labour and volunteering
Value of total time spent on domestic labour and volunteering, based on Time Use
Survey data, and valuing a unit of time equally across regions.
The usual way of approaching this is to account for the time spent in different unpaid
or voluntary activities and multiply this by a shadow wage rate, based either on the
domestic wage rate or on some other appropriate proxy. The results of this exercise,
using regional time use data and a national UK wage labour rate appropriate to
domestic labour, lead to a net positive contribution to the index which ranges
between £8.5 billion (North East, 2005) and £34.8 billion (South East, 1994).
Regional differences in these headline figures are due more to population sizes than
behavioural differences: there is only around 15% variation between regions in the
amount of time people spend on household chores and volunteering. For all regions
there is a falling trend over the period of the study because people tend to spend less
time in domestic labour (and as volunteers) today than they did even a decade ago.
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Public expenditure on health and education
All public expenditure on health and education included (defensive health spending
due to crime, car accidents and pollution subtracted elsewhere)
The result of including public expenditures on health and education in the R-ISEW is
to enhance both the absolute magnitude and the trend over time in the index. In this
calculation we include all expenditures on education, rather than only tertiary
education as in previous versions of the R-ISEW. The original Daly & Cobb ISEW
deemed 50% of education expenditure as ‘defensive’; and until now we followed a
similar approach by considering primary and secondary education expenditures as
defensive, and only tertiary as a positive addition to welfare. Both are somewhat
arbitrary deductions which have faced criticism in the past.
Public expenditures on health and education increased by an average of 78%
between 1994 and 2005 (rising much faster than both GVA and consumer
expenditure), and by 2005 represented around 14% of GVA. The increase in
spending in absolute terms ranges from £4.8 billion in the North East to £14.5 billion
in London, but as a proportion of spending in 1994, the growth was fairly similar in
each region. In the East of England it was 61% (£7.7 billion), while the North East
and South West both saw growth of 87% (£4.8 billion and £8 billion respectively).
The impact of incorporating social benefits
The overall impact of incorporating positive social benefits (the value of domestic
labour and the value of public expenditures on health and education) on top of the
economically adjusted expenditure measure is shown in Figure 7. As in the previous
chart, this figure shows the adjusted index for England on a per capita basis, together
with the regions at the top and bottom of the range of results in 2005.
Not surprisingly, the index is now considerably higher, and for most regions it rises
above GVA for the entire period. Only in London, the South East and East of England
do these first social adjustments fail to mitigate the large negative economic
adjustments in these regions, so the index at this point still lags behind GVA. In 2005,
the South West and West Midlands remain in position at the top and bottom ends of
the range of results at this stage of construction.
Costs of income inequality
Determined using the Atkinson Index for each region (calculated from the Family
Resources Survey).
The measure of inequality used for the R-ISEW is the Atkinson Index rather than the
more prevalent Gini co-efficient. The Atkinson measure has a strong foundation in
welfare economics, and allows for some sensitivity analysis on the parameter ε,
which represents society's aversion to inequality. At the most widely cited value of ε
(0.8), the costs associated with income inequality in England over the period vary
between £61 billion in 1994 and £87 billion in 2000.
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Figure 7: Combined impact of social benefits and economic adjustments.
Part of the rise in cost over the period is due to the rise in consumer expenditure,
because the monetarised cost of the Atkinson Index results involves a factor
adjustment to the baseline consumer expenditure data. But if we look at the value of
the Atkinson Index itself we see that the underlying measure of inequality has also
risen – in most regions. Exceptions to this rule are the North East and the East
Midlands, where the Atkinson Index fell by 23% and 10% respectively. Consequently,
while other regions saw an absolute increase in inequality costs of between 33%
(North West) and 63% (East of England), rises in these two regions were much less
pronounced: the North East saw an increase of just 0.3%, and the East Midlands a
modest 15%.
Costs of crime
Based on Home Office estimates of the social costs (including health costs) of
individual crimes in different categories, and incidence rates mostly from the British
Crime Survey, with additional data on vehicle crime and homicides from other
Government sources. Some defensive expenditure by business is also included.
Crime is frequently high on the political agenda, but unfortunately this does not
render the data on crime (or the interpretation of this data) any less complex or
contentious. The data presented here is based on recorded crime, however it is well
recognised in the literature that recorded crime may differ from actual crime levels for
a variety of reasons and reflecting these differences lies outside the scope of the
current work.58
As might be expected, the costs of crime are higher in regions with large metropolitan
areas – London and the North West in particular, and lower in predominantly rural
regions such as the North East, East of England and the South West. However, the
evolution of costs in each region over time is not so predictable. London and the
North West saw the cost of crime fall by 5.9% and 5% per capita respectively, only
slightly less than the South West's 7.9%. Per capita costs in the North East fell by a
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dramatic 20%, as compared to the East of England, where costs rose by 16.3%,
albeit from a relatively low starting point.
Over the period, regional disparities increased for the first few years. In 1997, the
social cost of crime in the East was just £86 per capita, as compared to £199 in
London in 2001. The range of costs as a proportion of the mean reached a peak of
82% in 1999, but has since converged to 54% by 2005; in absolute terms this
equates to £108 per capita in the East, £179 in London and £135 for the English
average. Regional totals range from £540 million in the East Midlands to £1,348
million in London. The divergences were driven largely by uneven changes in the
incidence of robbery, common assault, criminal damage and fraud. And while all
regions enjoyed substantial reductions in vehicle-related crime, some fared better
than others: in the North East and West Midlands it fell by 68% and 67% (totalling
£124 million and £263 million respectively), while in London the gain was less than
30% at £110 million.
Costs of divorce
Costs of divorce include defensive costs (identified in surveys commissioned by an
insurance company) and the costs of increased risk of mortality for divorcees.
Divorce imposes a variety of structural, legal and health-related costs on society, but
accounting for these is a contentious issue where cost estimates may be subject to
value-driven distortions. The R-ISEW has attempted to adopt a relatively
conservative estimate of the social costs of divorce based on information from the
insurance industry, and increased mortality costs.
The costs of divorce in make a modest contribution to the overall R-ISEW, ranging
from £430 million in the North East (in 2000) to £1.5 billion in the South East (in
2002). Over the period of the study, most regions saw costs fall as fewer marriages
dissolved, while the West Midlands saw an increase of 11.8%.59 The largest
reduction in the costs of divorce was in London, down 18.6% from £188 per capita in
1994 to £153 in 2005; Yorkshire and the Humber on the other hand started the
period at a very similar £189, but fell only 8.8% to £173 per capita.
Costs of commuting and car accidents
The costs of commuting include the loss of leisure time through time spent
commuting, and the direct spending costs of motoring and use of public transport.
The costs of car accidents include the costs of damage to vehicles and property and
the costs of ill-health and fatality. All data, including unit costs for commuting time,
come from the Department for Transport.
Our continued dependence on a ‘car culture’ is not without its price. As people drive
longer distances, the associated social costs from commuting and car accidents have
until recently tended to rise nationally.
Over the period from 1994 to 2005, the costs of commuting in England rose by
23.6% from £28 billion to £35 billion, as people travel longer distances to get to work.
This was particularly true across the South and East of the country (including the
East Midlands) where costs rose by 35–40%. In the North and West they rose more
slowly: by less than 15% in the North East, 21% in the West Midlands, and up to 32%
in the North West. Costs in London were much higher in absolute terms (almost
£1000 per capita in 1994, compared to the range of £440–580 elsewhere), but
actually dropped over the period while costs everywhere else rose. By 2005, per
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capita commuting costs in the North East were still only £509, but most regions were
in the mid-£600s, and London had fallen to £862.
By contrast, however, the costs associated with car accidents have fallen across the
board, from £14.8 billion in 1994 to £11.2 billion in 2005, as road safety measures
have begun to have an impact on the number and severity of road casualties.
London again performs well from a poor baseline on this factor, reducing its per
capita costs by over 47% from £372 in 1994 to £196 in 2005. Other regions also
tended to experience reductions reflecting their starting costs in 1994, as compared
to the English average at that time. So the East of England and the East and West
Midlands, which all had relatively high per capita costs in 1994, all enjoyed relatively
large reductions to 2005; whereas the relatively accident-free North East and South
West saw costs fall by a smaller proportion.
Costs of industrial accidents
Based on estimates of the UK-wide costs of industrial accidents, and regional
incidence rates from the Health and Safety Executive.
Following feedback from some regions that had an R-ISEW calculated previously, we
now incorporate the costs of industrial accidents into the R-ISEW for the first time,
following the logic that – like car accidents – these represent defensive expenditures,
the social externalities of industrial growth. It appears to be a worthwhile addition,
because this factor provides some very clear evidence of regional disparities. Total
costs range from around £700 million in the East and North East, to just over £3
billion in the South East.
In per capita terms, Yorkshire and the Humber and the South East have significantly
and consistently higher per capita costs than elsewhere (£397 and £364 respectively
in 1994, rising to £405 and £384 in 2005). The East of England has the lowest per
capita costs (£141 in 1994, falling yet further to £133 in 2005); while the South West
and North West both saw a large increase in per capita costs (23.3% and 29.2%
respectively).
The scope of this report only allows for a limited analysis of the Health and Safety
Executive data used to calculate these costs, but this yields no clear explanation for
the disparities. There are no apparent structural reasons such as the proportion of
regional population employed in particular sectors. This may be an area which merits
more detailed investigation into the underlying data.
The combined impact of social and economic factors
Taking economic adjustments to consumer expenditure into account, incorporating
social benefits and subtracting social costs, we can now see the impact of all these
factors on the adjusted measure. This is shown in Figure 8, where the adjusted
indicator is again shown on a per capita basis. Rising inequality and crime in the East
of England have conspired to displace Yorkshire and the Humber as the worst-
performing region at this stage of the index’s construction.
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Figure 8: Economic and social adjustments to consumer expenditure.
Note that after making both economic and social adjustments the index remains
higher than consumer expenditure. However, even the South West – the best-
performing region at this stage of the index's construction – remains below GVA
throughout, despite all the positive adjustments made thus far, and despite not yet
taking any account of environmental adjustments. These will depress the index
further still, as we will see in the next section.
3.3 Environmental factors
Several different kinds of environmental costs are worthy of consideration, even
though some of these may be in the process of becoming less important to the
economy. These costs include the costs associated with ‘local’ environmental
pollutants (air pollution, water pollution etc.), the implicit costs in losses of agricultural
land and natural habitats, the accumulated long-term costs associated with climate
change, and the depletion of finite (non-renewable) resources, in particular of fossil
energy resources. We discuss each of these adjustments in the following sections.
‘Local’ environmental pollution
Conventional ‘local’ air and water pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
chemical oxygen demand and so on have been the focus for environmental policy
initiatives for several decades now. In the English Regions R-ISEW, we have
accounted for four specific kinds of pollution costs under this category:
1. costs of local and regional air pollution (including sulphur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, carbon monoxide, particulates and volatile organic compounds).60
2. of water pollution (based on river quality measures and river quality targets);
3. costs of pollution abatement; and
4. costs of noise pollution (based on estimates of road traffic noise).
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Some previous ISEWs also include an estimate of ‘personal pollution control’ costs –
defensive costs by individuals against localised pollution, for instance water filters,
cycle masks or soundproofing dwellings against external noise. Reliable data is hard
to come by at the regional level, and as our best estimates for this were relatively
small anyway, we have decided to omit it from this and subsequent calculations.
The first two categories measure the environmental impact of local water and air
pollution – that is, the costs associated with levels of pollution actually recorded in the
environment. The third category accounts for the abatement costs to industry – that
is, expenditure at and before the point where emissions reach the smokestack or
waste pipe. We include these costs because they are passed on to the consumer in
higher prices, and are thus cashed out as a ‘benefit’ in the consumer expenditure
data used as the R-ISEW baseline. They are, however, clearly defensive costs which
cannot be said to positively contribute to welfare, and should therefore be deducted.
Taken together, the overall trend over time in the category of local pollution is a
declining one. Although noise pollution costs are on the rise, the others are falling,
and this category is dominated by the trends in air pollution, as we will see in more
detail below. The estimated cost of local environmental pollution across all English
regions has fallen from £49 billion in 1994 to less than £23 billion by 2005.
Again following trends in air pollution costs, we see that power-producing regions,
such as the East Midlands and Yorkshire and the Humber, have the highest overall
costs in this category – and the highest reductions over the period of the study, in
both absolute and proportional terms. Regions with little energy generation or heavy
manufacturing see lower costs and lower reductions: London and the South West, for
example.
Water pollution
The cost associated with having rivers of low chemical and biological quality, as
estimated by Defra. Levels of water quality for each region reported by the
Environment Agency.
Water pollution costs are relatively small by comparison with other costs, and in fact
have generally fallen over the period as a result of initiatives to protect river quality –
the total cost for all English regions was £436 million in 1994, falling 24% to £331
million by 2005. Note, though, that in recent years there has been a small upturn in
some regions, notably the East of England and the West Midlands. Regional costs of
water pollution range from around £8 million in the North East to £50 million in the
South East.
Regions which have had an R-ISEW calculated previously should note that this
component now excludes the costs associated with abating water pollution, as these
have been moved into a separate component, together with air pollution abatement.
Air pollution
The costs of damage to health and property of local air pollution, estimated from
various academic papers. Levels of air pollution for each region gathered from the
National Air Emissions Inventory.
The biggest single component contributing to local pollution is air pollution, although
thankfully these costs have come down a great deal over the period of the study. In
1994, the cost of air pollution in England was £41 billion. Since then, costs have
declined significantly as a result of EU and UK legislation on sulphur and nitrogen
oxides, and increasingly stringent local air quality regulations. As a result, the costs
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of air pollution fell by over 60% during the period and by 2005 were just over £15
billion.
This reduction in air pollution costs has occurred across the country, but has a much
greater impact in some regions, particularly power-producing regions, such as the
East Midlands and Yorkshire and the Humber, because of the emissions associated
with energy production. Such regions are hit very hard by this component of the R-
ISEW in earlier years (the costs are £7.2 billion and £7.6 billion respectively for
1994), but also benefit most over the period of the study from reductions enforced at
the smokestack.
In 2005, total costs are just £2.3 billion in the East Midlands and £2.6 billion in
Yorkshire and the Humber (reductions of £4.8 billion and £5 billion respectively). It is
no coincidence that these two regions experience some of the fastest growth in the
overall R-ISEW. By contrast, London has little energy generation or heavy
manufacturing, and also has the lowest absolute (and per capita) air pollution costs:
just over £2 billion (£293 per capita) in 1994, falling to £900 million (£123 per capita)
by 2005.
Pollution abatement
Current expenditure and annuitised capital expenditure per employee on pollution
abatement by sector from Defra. Labour Force Survey used to determine number of
employees in each sector for each region.
Pollution abatement costs are, of course, closely related to the prevalence of power
generation and heavy industry. The distribution of costs is therefore not very
surprising: low in London and the mainly rural South West, North East and East of
England; higher across the Midlands, the North West, Yorkshire and the Humber and
the South East. Costs in London are just £199 million in 2005 (£27 per capita);
compared to £540 million in the North West in the same year. Interestingly, the North
East has low absolute costs (£234 million in 2005), but the highest per capita costs
(£92 in 2005).
The North West has particularly high costs (£708 million in 1994, falling to £540
million in 2005) compared to regions with similar sized manufacturing sectors: the
West Midlands and South East have almost as many manufacturing jobs as the
North West, but noticeably lower abatement costs (£599 million and £586 million
respectively in 1994, and £402 million and £463 million in 2005). Without a more
thorough investigation which is beyond the scope of this study, we can only presume
the variation is due to the specific mix of industry active in each region and the
resulting polluting load.
Noise pollution
Based on three estimates of the costs of road traffic noise pollution in the UK, and
regional data from the Department for Transport. Aviation noise is costed similarly,
with the regional distribution of flights sourced from the Civil Aviation Authority.
In addition to noise pollution from road traffic, which was accounted for in previous
ISEWs, we now also incorporate an estimate of noise pollution from air travel. The
addition is relatively small compared to road noise, as flight noise is highly localised;
nevertheless, we believe it is worth including as this is a high-growth sector. In total,
the costs associated with noise pollution for the whole of England are £3.2 billion in
1994, rising to £3.8 billion in 2005. Costs for individual regions range from £148
million in the North East (1994) to £737 million in the South East (2005).
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Loss of farmlands and natural habitats
The value of natural habitats estimated based on a willingness-to-pay model using
data from the RSPB. The value of farmland and costs of soil erosion sourced from
earlier studies (see Appendix 4). Rates of farmland and natural habitat loss (or gain)
from the Countryside Survey and the Defra June Agricultural Census.
In the R-ISEW, these factors – particularly the loss of farmland – represent a modest
adjustment to the overall index. Most regions, however, continue to lose farmland
and natural habitats. As non-urbanised land becomes scarcer, so the unit value may
well increase, which would push up these costs in future. Note that in this calculation,
we look specifically at wetlands, so that the growth of managed forest for timber does
not offset the loss of more biologically diverse habitats.
Total costs of habitat loss for England rose by about £100 million from £2.2 billion to
£2.3 billion over the period of the study. The range within regions is from a mere £7
million in London (which of course has little in the way of wetlands to lose in the first
place) to £605 million in the North West (both figures from 2005). Farmland loss in
1994 cost around £650 million across England; this figure fell slightly to £630 million
by 2005 as some regions increased the area given over to agriculture. The South
West in particular has seen an extension of agricultural land, causing costs to fall
from £113 million in 1994 (the second highest costs in that year, exceeded only by
the East Midlands) to £86 million in 2005.
Note that these costs account for the accumulated loss of land since 1950, which
explains some of the results which may not be obvious at first glance. The East
Midlands for instance has quite high costs for farmland loss (£121–127 million) but
they neither rise nor fall much over the period: so though the historical loss has been
significant, it had stabilised by the mid-1990s. The South East on the other hand
started the period with a high level of accumulated loss (£112 million in 1994),
continued to lose farmland to other uses until 2002 (£151 million) and has regained a
little ground since then (£131 million in 2005).
Figure 9 below illustrates the combined effect of local pollution costs and loss of
farmlands and habitats.
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Figure 9: Impact of local environmental and land loss adjustments.
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Long-term costs of climate change
In the R-ISEW, we use a methodology aimed at addressing the question of long-term
ecological debt from a financial perspective (see Appendix4 for details). In summary,
this method treats the current accumulated debt as though it could be paid off over
time through an annuitised endowment fund which matures when required in the
future. Regular payments into this fund over the next 50 years (say) will be sufficient
to pay off the debt provided that we start making the payments today. Should we fail
to pay the premiums this year, however, the time available to achieve the required
sum at payout will shorten, and next year’s required payments will therefore be
higher. The costs of climate change in this R-ISEW have been distributed to the
point of emission (using data from the National Air Emissions Inventory), rather than
the point of consumption – that is to say that regions producing GHGs suffer higher
costs, rather than those regions consuming more energy.
The impact of this component on the index is significant, even in regions where per
capita emissions of GHGs are relatively low (comparing rural to energy-producing
regions, for example). The endowment premiums attributable to a climate change
fund for the whole of England in 1994 are estimated at £74 billion or 11% of GVA. By
the end of the period these premiums have increased by almost 40% – as a result on
the one hand of continuing emissions and on the other of our failure to implement a
payment plan – so that by 2005 they amount to almost £103 billion (11.3% of GVA).
For as long as no plans are put in place to reduce emissions and to establish a
dedicated climate fund against future costs, these premiums will continue to rise.
Looking at individual regions, we can clearly see how the major sources of
greenhouse gas emissions – power generation, road transport and (to a lesser
extent) industry – affect regional costs in this category. Power-producing regions
such as Yorkshire and the Humber and the East Midlands see very high costs here
(especially where coal is the fuel of choice): £14.4 billion for Yorkshire in 1994, rising
to over £20 billion in 2005; £9.8bn and £13.7 billion in the East Midlands. Densely-
populated regions with high road use also pay a price: results for the South East and
North West, for example, range from £11.5 billion and £8.7 billion respectively in
1994, to £16 billion and £12.2 billion in 2005. Meanwhile, the mainly rural and less
populous regions such as the North East and South West enjoy much lower costs:
both are around £5 billion in 1994 and £7 billion in 2005.
Results are similar in London, where not only is there little heavy industry, there isn’t
much agriculture. And although commuting costs are high in London, this is due to
the loss of leisure time rather than high road use, so in all, greenhouse gas
emissions for the region are quite low. The resulting costs are very similar to the
North East and South West in total, but much lower per capita: £980 in 2005 is less
than half the English average of £2,040 per capita, and way below Yorkshire and the
Humber or the East Midlands, at £3,976 and £3,186 respectively.
Resource depletion
Estimated as the cost of replacing fossil energy use with renewable energy, in line
with the replacement cost methodology of Cobb and Cobb. National energy use data
available from the former Department for Trade and Industry. Regional distribution
estimated using data on sectoral GVAs, population and travel.
Along with long-term environmental damage, our heavy use of non-renewable energy
makes this factor one of the most significant in the index. The costs of resource
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depletion across England increased from £71 billion in 1994 to £95 billion in 2005,
representing 10–11% of GVA in each year.
Some regions account for a larger proportion of this increase than others: London,
the South and East of England all see costs grow by around 40%. In absolute terms
this translates to amounts ranging from £6.6 billion in the South West to £12.1 billion
in the South East in 1994, rising to £9.2 billion and £16.7 billion respectively in 2005.
The North East sees the smallest rise of 24% from £3.6 billion to £4.4 billion; in the
remaining regions the increase is around 30% – for instance, a 33% increase from
£6.1 billion in 1994 to £8.2 billion for the East Midlands, and a 28% rise for the North
West, from £9.8 billion to £12.6 billion.
The reasons for this vary from region to region, as energy use is entwined with
almost every field of modern activity in varying degrees. In the East of England for
example, the rapid growth of Stansted airport since the early 1990s brings a 316%
increase in fuel use from air travel, so that by 2005 air travel accounts for almost 10%
of all energy use in the region. In fact, the low-cost flight boom has increased energy
use in this sector in all regions, according to the degree in which regional airports
around the country succeeded in adding mass-market, budget air travel to their
occasional domestic flights.
In 1994, industrial energy use accounted for an average of 27% of all energy use
across the regions; by 2005 this had fallen slightly to less than 25%. The drop is
driven largely by changes in the North West and the West Midlands, as heavy
manufacturing relocates to low labour-cost sites in Eastern Europe and the Far East.
Both regions see a drop of around 10% over the period of the study – from 7.3 million
tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 1994 to 6.5 in the North West, and from 6.1 mtoe to
5.5 mtoe in the West Midlands. The overall effect is mitigated by rising industrial
energy use in South East (up 7.4% to 7.6 mtoe) and, perhaps surprisingly, in the
South West (up 13.2% to 4.87 mtoe).
Unfortunately, the reductions in industrial energy use are more than offset by a much
steeper rise in energy use by private sector services. Even accounting for the shift in
service provision from public sector to private sector over the last decade, total
energy use in services has risen by 2.6 mtoe, almost four times the drop in industrial
energy use. And in addition to the growing use of transport fuel, our increasingly
profligate energy use in the domestic sector has thrown another 4.6 mtoe into the
mix.
The combined effects on the overall index of incorporating these two adjustments (for
greenhouse gas emissions and for resource depletion) are shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Cumulative impact of GHGs and resource depletion.
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4. R-ISEW in the English Regions
4.1 Overall trends
After all economic, social and environmental adjustments have been made, the final
R-ISEW for England is shown in Figure 11 below, plotted against GVA. The
difference between the two measures is striking. The total GVA in the English regions
rose by 37% from just under £670 billion in 1994 to just over £910 billion in 2005. By
comparison (Figure 11), the English R-ISEW started at a considerably lower point
(£357 billion) in 1994. It rose more or less steadily between 1994 and 2005, but was
still significantly below GVA (at £539 billion) by the end of the period.
On the basis of discussion in the previous subsections we can conclude that the
rising trend in R-ISEW was driven primarily by strong growth in consumption,
increased public expenditure on health and education, and significant reductions in
air pollution. The most significant countervailing forces were the costs associated
with climate change and the depletion of non-renewable resources, and a failure to
address the substantial and growing costs of income inequality.
On a per capita basis (Figure 12), the growth rates are slightly reduced (because
population was also growing) but the overall picture is largely the same: GVA and R-
ISEW grow steadily, but the R-ISEW does so at a significantly lower level than GVA.
Although the R-ISEW rises over the period, it does not do so as fast as GVA: the gap
between what we conventionally assume to be ‘progress’ and what might be a more
rounded vision of ‘progress’ is large – and still growing in absolute terms. To
appreciate the gap between conventional and economically adjusted measures of
progress, it is useful to look at the absolute difference between the two measures
over time. Figure 13 below plots GVA minus R-ISEW (per capita) over the period of
the study for England as a whole. The absolute difference between R-ISEW per
capita and GVA per capita increases from just under £6,500 in 1994 to almost £7,500
in 2005.
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Figure 11: English R-ISEW and GVA.
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Figure 12: English R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 13: Gap between English R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
4.2 Regional trends
Within this overall picture there are some significant regional differences, as Figures
14 to 22 illustrate. The following charts show the regional R-ISEW per capita against
the GVA per capita for each of the nine English Government Office Regions.
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Figure 14: North East R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 15: North West R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 16: Yorkshire and the Humber R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 17: East Midlands R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 18: West Midlands R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 19: Eastern R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 20: London R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 21: South East R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
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Figure 22: South West R-ISEW and GVA on per capita basis.
4.3 Differences across regions
In Figure 23 we illustrate some of the regional differences in per capita R-ISEW by
plotting the highest (South West region) and the lowest (Yorkshire and Humber
region) R-ISEWs against the English average per capita R-ISEW.
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Figure 23: Regional R-ISEW per capita (range and mean) .
Given these regional differences it is perhaps not surprising to find that the gap
between GVA per capita and R-ISEW per capita also varies between different
regions. Figure 24 plots the difference between GVA and R-ISEW for four regions,
the two with the highest and the two with the lowest gap.
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Figure 24: Per capita gap between R-ISEWs and GVA.
Both the North West and the South West regions have relatively small gaps, and
have, at times, managed to close them somewhat (although the overall trend over
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the period is a growing gap even in these regions). London has the highest per capita
gap throughout the period by a considerable margin, and it continues to widen; in the
South East, the gap is not only large, it is also increasing rapidly. Only the West
Midlands exceeds the South East's 35% growth: here the gaps roses 36% from
£4,108 per capita in 1994 to £5,607 in 2005.
Another way of representing these differences is by contrasting the performance of
each region on the R-ISEW with their performance in terms of GVA, as shown in
Figures 25 and 26.
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Figure 25: Per capita R-ISEWs and GVAs by region in 2004.
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Figure 26: Per capita R-ISEWs and GVAs by region in 2004.
Overall patterns
Whereas the top three regions in terms of GVA per capita are concentrated around
London and the Home Counties (the South East and the East of England), the R-
ISEW paints a rather different picture, with the North West and South West leading
the way in 2004 (and indeed across our 12-year time-series). For the North West, in
particular, this represents a large shift in relative performance (from seventh place in
terms of GVA to second place in terms of the R-ISEW). Whilst London doesn’t
perform quite as well in terms of R-ISEW as it does in terms of GVA (coming third
instead of first in 2004), it certainly performs better than the neighbouring regions (the
South East dropping to fifth place, and the East of England dropping to seventh).
Interestingly, it has made considerable gains in terms of R-ISEW over our time-
series, moving up from the seventh place it held between 1994 and 1998 to a
consistent third place by 2001.
The Midlands emerge in the middle of the rank order both in terms of GVA and R-
ISEW. However, the West Midlands performs relatively better than the East
Midlands, rising from sixth place in terms of GVA to fourth place in terms of R-ISEW.
The East Midlands drops from fifth to fourth. Lastly, along the northeast coast of
England, Yorkshire and the North East exchange places, with the North East moving
up from bottom place to second from bottom (eighth).
GVA R-ISEW
 Well below mean
 Below mean
 Above mean
 Well above mean
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Key components
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Change in net international position
Consumer expenditure
Long-term environmental damage
Net capital growth
Effects of income distribution
Costs of air pollution
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Public exp. on health & education
Costs of commuting
Costs of industrial accidents
Depletion of non-renewable resources
Costs of loss of natural habitats
Costs of car accidents
Consumer durables
Costs of crime
Cost of pollution control
Costs of family breakdown
Costs of noise pollution
Costs of loss of farmlands
Costs of water pollution
Per capita range across regions
(2005/06 £)
Figure 27: Range across regions of values for each component.
To understand these patterns, we need to go below the headline R-ISEW figure to
explore the component patterns. Given the summative methodology of the ISEW, it
is absolute differences in value across regions for each component that determine
their importance in shifting overall R-ISEW, rather than relative differences. For
example, the costs of loss of farmland and soil erosion in the East Midlands are
some 220 times greater per capita than that in London. However, as neither figure is
particularly big compared to other components (approximately £30 per person in East
Midlands compared to some £3,000 per person for the costs of long-term
environmental damage in the same region), these large relative effects have little
impact on overall R-ISEWs. Figure 27 shows the range for each component, defined
as the maximum regional per capita value minus the minimum regional per capita
value for each year, averaged across the 12-year time-series. The following
paragraphs will focus on those components of the R-ISEW which carry the greatest
absolute values and differences. Unless otherwise stated, analyses have been
carried out for the year 2004.
Consumer expenditure and income distribution
Whilst consumer expenditure is obviously strongly correlated with GVA, the different
patterns the two statistics produce across regions is important in determining the
GVA–R-ISEW gap, particularly given the high absolute figures for this component
(which is of course the starting point for R-ISEW calculations). Generally, use of
consumer expenditure instead of GVA per capita serves to reduce the variance
across regions, consumer expenditure having a standard deviation little over one-
third that of GVA (£1,079 per capita vs £3,124 per capita), and a coefficient of
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variance half that of GVA. Using consumer expenditure also changes the order of
the regions, with London in third rather than first place (behind the South East and
the East of England), Yorkshire & Humberside moving up to fifth place from eighth,
and the West Midlands dropping from sixth to eighth. However, all these shifts run in
contrast to the overall changes in rank produced by using the R-ISEW instead of
GVA. In other words, the quite large differences in consumer expenditure between
regions do not actually help us understand the patterns of R-ISEW, other than
reducing the gaps between poorer and wealthier regions that would be registered
using GVA. Adjusting consumer expenditure by income distribution has a similar
effect, the costs of income distribution by region correlating almost perfectly with
GVA (R = 0.99).
Economic adjustments
The biggest component of the R-ISEW in terms of range across regions is actually
net international position. Changes over time have already been discussed in
section 3.1, particularly London’s success in slashing its deficit over time. However,
by 2004, it is still more northern regions that have the healthiest balance of
payments. Given the size of this component, we have highlighted this in the map in
figure 28a. Of the four regions with positive balances of payment (the North East,
East Midlands, North West and South West), three perform better in the R-ISEW
rankings than the GVA rankings (the exception being the East Midlands). This, and
the contribution to London’s improving R-ISEW made by its reducing deficit, suggests
that a surplus in the balance of payments is a key factor in ensuring a high R-ISEW.
Net capital growth is also a big contributor to variation in the R-ISEW, with Yorkshire
& Humberside having the largest value in 2004 (£1,278 per capita), whilst London
continued to witness negative growth (-£790 per capita). These differences,
however, do not help us to understand variation in R-ISEW very much. The only
region where strong performance on net capital growth seems to coincide with a
strong performance in the R-ISEW, is the North West, which had the third-highest
figure for net capital growth in 2004.
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Figure 28: Net international position and long-term environmental
damage across the regions.
nvironmental costs
nvironmental costs are a key determinant of the relative performance of the regions.
he second-biggest component, aside from consumer expenditure, is long-term
nvironmental damage. Figure 28b visualises the patterns described in section 3.3.
his component helps explain London’s relatively better performance on the R-ISEW
han its neighbouring regions. It also seems to contribute to the generally better
erformance of western regions on the R-ISEW, with the North West, West Midlands
nd South West recording lower CO2 emissions than their eastern counterparts.61
ir pollution costs follow a similar pattern (which is unsurprising given they are
alculated from similar data sources). Again, north and eastern regions (the East
idlands, Yorkshire and the Humber, and the North East) record the biggest costs,
hilst London and the South West have the lowest. The pattern is congruent with
verall R-ISEW scores. Further, it is worth noting that the North West, whilst being a
elatively industrial region, maintains relatively low air-pollution costs (the third-lowest
n fact).
hilst the costs of resource depletion are very high across England, there is
elatively little variation across regions. Nonetheless, the relatively high figures for
he South East and the East of England contribute to the regions’ relatively poor
erformance on the R-ISEW. Similarly, the relatively low figures for the South West
nd London (third- and fourth-lowest respectively), contribute to their relatively strong
erformances.
ther important components
ublic expenditure on health and education also appears to be an important
eterminant of the R-ISEW. London, the North East and the North West all spend
Net International Position Long Term Environmental Damage
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relatively large amounts on health and education, per capita, whilst the East of
England and the South East both spend relatively low amounts.
On the other hand, the costs of commuting have the strongest negative effect on
London (thanks to the inclusion of the costs of the time spent commuting, rather than
just the money spent). According to our analyses, the total costs were £983 per
person in London, compared with £509 per person in the North East. Most other
regions were around the £650 per person mark, with the only exception being the
higher costs in the South East.
The last component to have a large and interesting effect on the R-ISEW is the cost
of industrial accidents. The highest per capita costs per region are recorded by
Yorkshire and the Humber, and the South East, which both perform relatively poorly
on the R-ISEW. Meanwhile, aside from the very low costs in the East of England, the
next three best-performing regions (the North West, London and the West Midlands),
are all regions performing relatively well on the R-ISEW.
4.4 Trends in variation
It is interesting to explore in more detail the overall level of disparities between
different regions, by representing the range of results for specific components of the
per capita R-ISEW as a percentage of the average English per capita ISEW. If we
take the highest cost minus the lowest cost in each component in each year and then
express this as a percentage of the English mean in that year, we get a measure of
how much variation there is between regions for each component. By plotting this
over time, we get a sense not only of the comparative differences between regions
for different components, but also of whether the regions are converging (becoming
more equal) or diverging (becoming less equal) over time with respect to these
components.
Figure 29 shows the overall level of regional variation for the per capita English R-
ISEW as a whole. This is plotted against variations in two other conventional
headline measures, the GVA per capita and consumer expenditure per capita, for
comparative purposes. As we have already remarked, the variation in consumer
expenditure between regions has remained at around 30%, with a slight divergence
evident over the period. The variation in GVA is higher than the variation in consumer
expenditure and shows a much clearer divergence over the period: i.e. regional
differences in output and expenditure appear to be increasing over time.
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Figure 29: Regional variation in R-ISEW, GVA and consumer expenditure.
Interestingly, however, Figure 29 reveals that the variation in R-ISEW has decreased
markedly over the time period, from around 51% in 1994 to 32% in 2005, suggesting
that adjusted economic well-being is now more equally shared across the regions
than it was a decade or so ago. Some of the underlying influences on this trend are
illustrated in Figures 30 and 31.
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Figure 30: Regional variations in selected component factors.
Figure 30 includes those components which contribute most significantly to the index,
such as climate change and resource depletion, and those which show a particularly
striking trend, such as commuting and income inequality. Commuting is not a major
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contributor in absolute terms, but the convergence in costs between regions is
notable. Income inequality (drawn in red in the graph) satisfies both criteria: it is a
major determinant of the overall R-ISEW, and it is an area in which regional
differences are significant and increasing.
The convergence in R-ISEW between regions is driven primarily by strong
convergence in air pollution costs (green in Figure 30), and to a lesser extent, by
trends in commuting, crime, divorce, car accidents and water pollution, all of which
have become more equal across regions. Pushing against these convergent trends
are some clear divergent pressures in other components, principally income
distribution, resource depletion and noise pollution. Net international position and net
capital growth also diverge noticeably (Figure 31) and are shown on a separate axis,
because the underlying datasets for both of these components are quite volatile,
which amplifies this measure of regional disparity.
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Figure 31: Trends in selected regional disparities.
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5. Concluding remarks
This report reports on an exercise to construct pilot Regional Indexes of Sustainable
Economic Well-being (R-ISEWs) for all nine Government Office Regions – and for
England as a whole. It finds that, overall, the English ISEW rises consistently over
the period between 1994 and 2005, although it remains throughout significantly lower
than the conventional economic measure of GVA. More worryingly, the absolute
difference between GVA and R-ISEW appears to be still widening.
The increase in R-ISEW is driven by a variety of factors. In particular, it is strongly
shaped by the underlying (rising) trend in consumer expenditure. But it is also
influenced by some positive environmental and social trends, such as the decline in
local air and water pollution, increases in public spending on health and education,
some decline in the costs of car accidents and a stabilisation in the costs of crime
and divorce. Countervailing forces include the rising costs of income inequality, an
increase in the costs of commuting, and the continuing failure to address the long-
term costs of climate change.
When it comes to individual regions, the study makes clear that there are significant
variations in R-ISEW across the regions. The South West region appears to have the
highest level of per capita R-ISEW over the period, while the Yorkshire and the
Humber region has the lowest. The gap between GVA and R-ISEW is largest for
London and the South East, which also has the fastest growing gap. Interestingly,
some regions show a degree of convergence between GVA and R-ISEW at least
over some years within the study period. The smallest gaps between GVA and R-
ISEW are found in the North West and the South West, which appears to be closing
the gap in recent years.
There are also some interesting trends over time in regional variations. On the whole,
the regional disparities in R-ISEW appear to be declining, in spite of a diverging trend
in regional GVA. The convergent trend in R-ISEW is shown to be driven by a number
of factors: some – such as the decline in air pollution across regions – are positive in
terms of sustainability; others – such as the increase in the costs of commuting – are
less favourable. There are also some clear countervailing (divergent) trends in
factors, such as income inequality, resource depletion and net capital growth.
Compiling adjusted economic measures at the regional level is by no means
straightforward. In this study, not all components could be compiled directly from
existing regional datasets. Some had to be estimated using regional proxies to adjust
national datasets. Others required specific regional changes to the ‘national’
methodology for constructing the ISEW.
As with all such exercises, the results are limited in their validity in part by the
availability and robustness of the underlying data, and in part by the difficulty in
making unequivocal choices about key parameters. As the R-ISEW has been applied
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and developed, some of these choices have been revisited, leading to differences
between the results derived here and those derived in earlier R-ISEWs. These
differences are summarised in Appendix 3. Appendix 4 provides a detailed
methodological discussion of all the individual components of the Index. Appendix 5
carries out a sensitivity analysis on selected components of the Index, from which it
is clear that the positive trend over time is sensitive to certain key choices and
parameters.
In summary, this pilot study shows that it is possible to construct R-ISEWs for the
English regions on a consistent and comparable basis. The results appear more
favourable for some regions than for others, but there are some clear positive trends
in all regions. R-ISEW is higher in every region in 2005 than it was in 1994. On the
other hand, the R-ISEWs are all much lower than GVA in absolute terms and during
the last few years the gap between GVA and R-ISEW has tended to widen.
Sensitivity analyses (Appendix 5) reveal that on less optimistic assumptions, this gap
could be wider still.
There is therefore little ground for complacency in any of the English regions. A
robust effort to tackle income inequality, climate change and resource depletion will
be necessary if the long-term vision of sustainable economic well-being is to be
achieved.
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Appendix 1. Alternative indicators of progress
‘[B]eyond a certain point, economic growth may cease to promote
social welfare. In fact, it would appear that, when an industrial society
reaches an advanced state of affluence, the rate of increase in social
welfare drops below the rate of economic growth, and tends ultimately
to become negative.’
Xenophon Zolotas, 1981.
This appendix supplements Section 2 of the report, by providing further information
on different indicators of progress. See, for example Haggerty et al. (2004),
McGillivray & Noorbakhsh (2004), Canoy & Lerais (2007), and Goossens (2007), for
further reviews of well-being and sustainable development indicators.62,63,64,65
The final part of this appendix focuses on the development of adjusted economic
measures, and particularly on the history of the ISEW.
A1.1 Quality of life indicator sets
Periodic revisions of the SNA have taken place over the last 50 years. Recognising
the limitations of conventional economic indicators, more recent revisions have
attempted to widen the scope of the conventional national accounts to incorporate
data and indicators relating to environmental and social factors. In 1993, the UN first
proposed that countries should adopt integrated environmental and economic
accounting.66 The basis of this revision was to propose a set of ‘satellite accounts’ to
complement the collection of conventional economic data.
The most recent revision of the SNA includes a detailed system of Integrated
Economic and Environmental Accounting (SEEA 2003) which brings together
economic and environmental information in a combined framework.67 Its aim is to
provide policy-makers with indicators and statistics to monitor the interactions
between economy and environment, as well as ‘a database for strategic planning and
analysis to identify more sustainable paths of development’.
SEEA 2003 incorporates four categories of accounts: flow accounts for pollution,
energy and materials; an account of expenditures on environmental protection and
resource management; an account of changes in the stocks of natural resources;
and valuations of the environmental damage and resource depletion arising from
economic activities. These accounts are intended to be an adjunct to rather than a
modification of the core SNA. For the most part, there has been no systematic
implementation of the SEEA across the EU. Individual countries have developed
various kinds and types of satellite accounting, some of them based on the UN SEEA
recommendations. These satellite accounts tend to incorporate a variety of different
kinds of social and environmental indicators.
An example of the development of satellite accounts is provided by the UK
Sustainable Development Indicator set. The UK’s 1999 Strategy established a
detailed set of 147 indicators measuring different aspects of quality of life.68 The
intention of the strategy was that these indicators should make up a ‘quality of life
barometer’ which will be used to measure ‘overall progress’ towards ‘a better quality
of life for everyone, now and for generations to come’. The sustainable development
indicator set includes factors such as adult numeracy and literacy, social investment
as a percentage of GDP, river quality, levels of reported crime, air pollution levels,
greenhouse gas emissions, waste arisings, and populations of wild birds as well as
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the more conventional economic indicators, such as GDP per capita and employment
rates.69 The latest edition of the Sustainable Development Indicators, launched in
2007, includes subjective measures of well-being as well.70
At regional level, implementation of the concept of satellite accounts has been
patchy. In the UK, most regional effort has been focused around the development of
regional economic strategies, regional spatial strategies and regional sustainable
development strategies. These initiatives, which have gained increasing ground over
the last decade, have now begun to spawn some useful regional databases. For
example, the set of targets and actions identified by East Midlands in support of its
ten strategic priorities can be thought of as a form of satellite accounts.
At the local authority level, the Audit Commission will, in 2009, based on work by the
Young Foundation and nef, recommend how best to bring together data from the
new 198 national indicators to form a coherent well-being indicator set.
The advantage of developing extended indicator sets of this kind is obvious. It allows
national and regional governments at any one point in time to assess progress
towards key social or environmental policy targets, and to understand how trends in
different factors are evolving. Such databases are an essential first step, not just in
understanding regional environmental and social trends but also in providing the
foundation for adjusted economic indicators of the kind developed in this report.
One of the disadvantages of this approach however is the unwieldiness of such a
disparate set of indicators. Recognising this, the UK Government selected 15
representative ‘headline’ indicators to reflect different aspects of its strategic
sustainable development objectives. But even 15 indicators can present potentially
confusing policy messages to policy-makers. What does it mean if seven of the
indicators go upwards, and eight go downwards? Is this better or worse than the
case in which eight go upwards and only seven go downwards, but go down more
dramatically? Does it depend on which go up and which go down? How, in fact, can
we make a balanced assessment of ‘overall progress’ on the basis of this
knowledge?
In addition, of course, the identification of a limited set of headline indicators also
introduces an element of selectivity (if not arbitrariness) into the measurement of
progress. This is not to suggest that having a comprehensive set of satellite accounts
is a waste of time. Far from it. But it does not necessarily take us any further forward
in determining the ‘overall’ direction of progress, or allow us to investigate potential
tradeoffs with economic growth.
A1.2 Composite quality of life indicators
One way of addressing the multiplicity of indicators is to aggregate separate
components of satellite accounts into a single index. An early attempt to construct
such a composite indicator was Morris’s Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) which
quite simply aggregated measures of infant mortality, literacy and life expectation into
a single unweighted indicator.71 Slottje’s Multidimensional Quality of Life Index
incorporates 20 attributes including civil liberty, life expectancy, infant mortality,
percentage of women and children in the labour force, energy consumption per
capita, national territory per square kilometre of road and per capita GDP.72 Estes’s
Index of Social Progress aggregates 36 social indicators into a single measure.73
Another index involving 15 (mainly economic) variables has been developed at the
Center for Living Standards in Ottawa, Canada.74
By far the most well-known and widely used attempt to construct a composite quality
of life index is the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development
Index (HDI).75 Influenced heavily by the work of Amartya Sen, the HDI is composed
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of three elements: GDP per capita, life expectancy at birth and education, assessed
in terms of literacy and school enrolment rates.76 Reported annually for 177 countries
in the world, the HDI has been very successful in raising the level of debate about the
relationship between income growth and well-being. It has also helped to promote
intelligent debate about health, education and poverty as related policy objectives in
the World Bank and elsewhere.77
The main advantage of the composite quality of life indicators is to have a single
point of comparison between different nations on the basis of a given set of
objectively measurable factors known to affect quality of life. Such indicators,
however, suffer from a lack of transparency and tangibility. What does an HDI of
0.703 look like? More importantly, as many authors have noted, they require
typically arbitrary decisions to be made regarding weightings.78,79 One solution to this
is discussed at the end of section A.1.3.
A1.3 Indicators of subjective well-being
A very different approach to the measurement of well-being derives from the
understanding that economic resources are not in themselves final goods, but only
intermediary in the ‘production’ of human well-being. Final welfare, according to one
economist, ‘consists of states of consciousness only and not material things’.80
Another early economist argued that the services enjoyed by final consumers could
be thought of as ‘psychic income’.81 From this perspective, it is legitimate to ask: can
we measure this psychic income directly by inquiring about people’s own perceptions
of their quality of life.
This avenue of exploration has been developed widely over the last 30–40 years, on
the back of an interest in how well people think they (and society) are doing. The
most well-known indicators in this category attempt to measure reported life
satisfaction – or ‘subjective well-being’ – by using survey methods based around
questions such as: ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a
whole nowadays?’ In the UK, as of 2007, Defra has begun to collect data on this
question as an indicator of subjective well-being.82
Though simple in concept, the results of this exercise can be useful in understanding
trends in life satisfaction in different countries and also in interrogating the
relationship between per capita income and people’s happiness.
An interesting pattern begins to emerge from this data. It transpires that in poorer
countries, increases in subjective well-being correlate well with rising income per
capita. But as income per capita grows, the correlation is much less marked. For
countries with per capita incomes over $20,000 there is almost no increase in life
satisfaction as GDP per capita continues to increase.83
This result appears to suggest that income is an important factor in improving
people’s well-being in poorer countries. But if improving well-being is the goal of
development, then the importance of income diminishes as people get richer. At the
level of the individual nation, the data appear to suggest a powerful ‘life-satisfaction
paradox’. Incomes in such countries have almost doubled in the last thirty years, but
life satisfaction has barely changed at all.
If rising consumption is supposed to deliver increasing levels of well-being, these
data on stagnant ‘life satisfaction’ pose a series of uncomfortable questions for
modern society. Why is life satisfaction not improving in line with higher incomes? Is
economic growth delivering improved well-being or not? What exactly is the
relationship between income growth and life satisfaction?
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Explanations for the life-satisfaction paradox have been sought in a variety of
different places.84,85 Some authors highlight the fact that relative income has a bigger
effect on individual well-being than absolute levels of income. If my income rises
relative to those around me I am likely to become happier. If everyone else’s income
rises at the same rate as my own, I am less likely to report higher life satisfaction.
Moreover, if my increase in income causes envy in those around me, my increased
satisfaction is likely to be offset by dissatisfaction in others, such that aggregate life
satisfaction across the nation may not change at all.
Others point to the impact of ‘hedonic adaptation’. As I get richer, I simply become
more accustomed to the pleasure of the goods and services my new income affords
me. And if I want to maintain the same level of happiness, I must achieve ever higher
levels of income in the future just to stay in the same place.
Others have suggested a different – but equally radical – explanation for the life-
satisfaction paradox. In their examination of quality of life in 74 different countries,
The Economist’s Intelligence Unit suggested the explanation for the paradox was that
‘there are factors associated with modernisation that, in part, offset its positive
impact’. It argues that:
‘[a] concomitant breakdown of traditional institutions is manifested in
the decline of religiosity and of trade unions; a marked rise in various
social pathologies (crime, and drug and alcohol addiction); a decline in
political participation and of trust in public authority; and the erosion of
the institutions of family and marriage.’86
The point about these changes – which have occurred hand-in-hand with the rise in
incomes and the expansion of individual choice – is not that income growth is
irrelevant to individual quality of life; we have already noted that it is relevant. Rather
it is that the pursuit of income growth appears to have undermined some of the
conditions (family, friendship, community) on which we know that people’s long-term
well-being depends.87,88
Returning to issues of measurement, one should note that the single life-satisfaction
question has little use for policy makers on its own. Obviously, no single figure can
offer fine-grained information or recommend specific policies. There is no
immediately apparent ‘theory of change’ at hand when low levels of life satisfaction
are found. Secondly, whilst life satisfaction does appear to correlate with interesting
measures at the individual level, there is evidence that it lacks sensitivity when taken
at the aggregate national level.89,90,91 In other words, we may find that overall life
satisfaction does not respond to policy changes in a useful manner. Given these
problems, nef has begun exploring more textured measures of subjective well-being.
For example, the Caerphilly Sustainability Index survey has recently been developed,
which includes questions on not just hedonic well-being, but also the Aristotelian
concept of eudaimonic92 well-being. Meanwhile the European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions runs a European Quality of Life
Survey which brings together data to explore levels of ‘deficit’ across Europe.93 Four
types of deficit are considered – having deficits, loving deficits, being deficits and
time deficits. Both these approaches have the potential to provide policy-makers with
more textured information on well-being. as with objective indicators, however, the
problem of aggregation remains – for example does reducing ‘having deficits’ justify
an increase in ‘loving deficits’?
Another approach to the problems of sensitivity and policy implications is to return to
objective data sources, but to use subjective data to help develop non-arbitrary
weights. The Economist’s Intelligence Unit has recently explored this approach,
combining aggregate-level objective data to produce a single Quality of Life Index,
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using weightings derived from regression analyses using the objective indicators as
independent variables and life satisfaction as the dependent.94 This produces a
single, predicted life-satisfaction value which has the potential to change over the
years (if weightings are held constant), but also offers clear levers for policy change
by identifying which objective conditions determine well-being and to what extent.
At the moment, however, this approach has not been fully explored, and remains
rather atheoretical and data-driven.
A1.4 Adjusted economic indicators
One of the first people to highlight the deficiencies of conventional economic
measures of progress was the US economist Robert Eisner. The basis of his
argument was that the GDP fails to distinguish appropriately between intermediate
and final goods and cannot therefore be regarded as even a consistent measure of
economic welfare. It counts investment in roads, for example, as a final good rather
than an intermediary. It fails to account for some things – such as unpaid household
labour – that clearly contribute directly to economic welfare. It includes work-related
spending by households (such as commuting costs) as a final good, even though
they are clearly only intermediary in the production of other aspects of economic
welfare.95,96
The result of Eisner’s critique was the development of a new accounting framework –
the Total Income System of Accounts (TISA) designed to correct for some of these
deficiencies. Though wide-ranging and impressive in its attempt to impose coherence
on economic accounting structures, TISA was also notable for the absence of certain
important aspects of well-being. For example, it fails to deal with the question of
income distribution and it takes no account of the depreciation of natural assets or
the loss of environmental quality.
Nonetheless, Eisner’s attempt to correct – in economic terms – for the deficiency of
the SNA was clearly one of the inspirations for others to attempt the same task. In
particular, if it were possible to incorporate some of the environmental and social
costs associated with income growth into a single measure of economic welfare, it
was argued, this would provide a powerful way of understanding whether or to what
extent growth was really contributing to overall progress in society. As we shall see in
this section, this provided the inspiration for the development of a variety of adjusted
economic measures including the ISEW.
Understanding GDP
GDP may be viewed (and is conventionally calculated) in three different, but formally
equivalent ways. It may be seen first as the total of all incomes (wages and profits)
earned from the production of domestically owned goods and services. Next, it may
be regarded as the total of all expenditures made either in consuming the finished
goods and services or investing for future consumption. Finally it can be viewed as
the sum of the value added by all the activities which produce economic goods and
services. It is this third calculation which allows for the GVA to be used as a regional
proxy for GDP.
Of the three formulations, however, it is the second which provides (arguably) the
strongest foundation for a welfare-based interpretation of GDP. Specifically, the
expenditure formulation sums all private and public consumption expenditures and
adjusts these to account for net exports and the formation of fixed capital (i.e. gross
investment). Since the sum of consumption expenditures is equivalent (under certain
conditions) to the value placed by consumers on consumption goods, the GDP can
be taken – according to the conventional interpretation – as a proxy for the well-being
derived from consumption activities.
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In formal economic terms, however, the equivalence of consumption expenditures
with consumer values is valid only in perfect, equilibrium markets, and it is well
enough known that in practice, markets are not perfect. Consumer preferences are
not always the result of free, informed choice. Perfect information is particularly
problematic in a message-dense society such as the one we live in. Consumers often
find themselves ‘locked-in’ to specific patterns of consumption by a combination of
perverse incentives, inequalities of access, social norms and expectations, marketing
pressures and sheer habit.97 To make matters worse, it is clear that public
expenditure does not take place in equilibrating markets at all; government spending
is not allocated according to market forces but according to the political and social
priorities of the day.
Throughout much of the latter part of the twentieth century, the response advocated
by economic and social theorists – particularly those on the right – to these market
‘failures’ was to strive for fewer market distortions: reduced taxation, improved
information, lower public expenditure, less government intervention; in short to
pursue hands-off, laissez-faire government. Since this strategy also has the
consequence of placing more disposable income in the pockets of the electorate and
reducing the drain on the public purse, it has had a strong appeal across the political
spectrum.98
But the welfare-theoretic interpretation of GDP falls heavily at a number of hurdles
other than those associated with simple market failure.99 Even conventional
economic theory recognises that it is not sufficient to attend only to current levels of
consumption. Well-being today, it is understood, consists at least in part in feeling
secure about our own (and our children’s) well-being in the future. Future
consumption possibilities must also play some part in any account of sustainable
well-being. This realisation has a long pedigree and has formed the basis for
numerous attempts to revise or adjust the GDP as a well-being measure.
Hicksian income and the Net Domestic Product
The point was raised long ago by the economist John Hicks that ‘the purpose of
income calculations in practical affairs is to give people an indication of the amount
which they can consume [in the present] without impoverishing themselves’ [in the
future]. Thus, ‘true’ income should be calculated as ‘the amount that a community
can consume over some time period and still be as well off at the end of the period
as at the beginning’.100 Being as well off at the end of the period depends inter alia on
having the same consumption possibilities in the following period. Since these
consumption possibilities flow from income streams which are generated by capital
investment, this requirement has often been translated into a demand to maintain
capital intact. On one interpretation therefore, ‘true’ income is the income in the
period minus the net depreciation of capital during that period.
At the national level, this would lead us to compute first the Net Domestic Product
(NDP) by subtracting the depreciation of all capital assets from the GDP. Hicks’s
argument suggests that the NDP provides a better representation of national well-
being than does the GDP. In fact, in a seminal paper in welfare economics, Martin
Weitzmann argued that the NDP can be regarded as a proxy for sustainable national
welfare in the sense that (under certain conditions at least) it is proportional to the
present discounted value of all future consumption.101
In particular, therefore, a non-declining NDP can be taken as an indication of non-
declining consumption possibilities into the future. Conversely, of course, the pursuit
of NDP growth assumes (under this interpretation) a welfare-theoretic justification.
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Though GDP may be flawed as a measure of societal well-being, an appropriate
correction for capital depreciation is (according to Weitzmann and others) a suitable
proxy for sustainable welfare.
It is clear that a correction of the kind outlined in the previous section requires only a
marginal adjustment to the conventional picture. In 2000, for instance, NDP in the
UK, as conventionally calculated, would have differed from GDP by less than 3%.
The orthodox view, in which increasing quality of life is correlated with economic
growth, might be regarded as surviving this kind of adjustment more or less intact.
Adjusted Net Savings (genuine savings)
One very obvious extension of the Hicksian approach would be to account for the
depreciation not just of physical (human-made) capital, but also of natural capital (the
natural resource base) and human capital (the skills and capabilities of the
population). This is the basis for an indicator called the Adjusted Net Savings –
developed originally as the Genuine Savings Index by World Bank economist Kirk
Hamilton.102,103 In principle, Adjusted Net Savings measures the ‘true rate of savings
in an economy’ after taking into account investments in human capital, depletion of
natural resources and damage caused by pollution.
In practice, Adjusted Net Savings is calculated as the gross savings in the economy
net of four104 important factors: the depreciation of physical capital (as in NDP); the
net depletion of energy, mineral and forestry resources;105 expenditure on education
(as a proxy for investment in human capital), and the estimated cost of annual carbon
emissions (as an indicator of environmental damage).106 Adjusted Net Savings is now
calculated by the World Bank for around 150 countries and reported annually in the
World Bank Indicators report.107
It is in principle possible to calculate a ‘Green Net National Product’ (GNNP) by
replacing the gross investment component of GDP with Adjusted Net Savings. The
resulting index would clearly be an improvement over GDP as a measure of welfare
in an economy. At the same time, the Adjusted Net Savings measure has been
criticised for being over-restrictive in its methodology – for example in relation to
calculating resource depletion. It is also clear that in practice, GNNP does not entirely
escape the kinds of criticisms traditionally levelled against GDP. It is therefore
worthwhile to explore some more systematic attempts to construct adjusted
measures of economic welfare.
Early adjusted measures of economic welfare
Amongst the earliest attempts to address the shortfalls of GDP as a measure of
economic welfare was a landmark paper published in 1972 by Nordhaus and Tobin,
entitled Is Growth Obsolete? In that paper, the authors constructed a ‘measure of
economic welfare’ (MEW) by adjusting GDP to account for certain economic and
social factors not normally included in the GDP. The original MEW was less
concerned with the environmental factors affecting economic welfare. The results of
the exercise indicated that between 1929 and 1965, economic welfare – as
measured by the Nordhaus and Tobin index – increased consistently; but that the
growth rate in MEW was somewhat slower than the growth rate in GDP. The authors
concluded from this analysis that growth was not obsolete; that, on the contrary, it
continued to deliver increasing levels of welfare; and that as an indicator of well-
being, GDP could still be regarded as robust.
When Nordhaus examined the same question from an environmental perspective in
1992, in a paper entitled Is Growth Sustainable? he discovered that his (revised)
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MEW began to diverge more substantially from GDP in the later years of the study.
Nordhaus attributed this increased divergence to ‘conventional sources’ such as
declining productivity growth and dwindling savings rather than to the unsustainable
use of natural resources. But the importance of the study was already clear enough:
by making certain economic, social and environmental adjustments to the
conventional measure, it had been possible to show that GDP could not necessarily
be regarded as a robust indicator even of economic welfare, let alone of social well-
being or quality of life.
A more radical attempt to incorporate environmental and resource effects into an
adjusted economic indicator for the US was pioneered by Zolotas.108 Even in the mid-
1970s Zolotas was able to demonstrate that his index of the Economic Aspects of
Welfare (EAW) rose more slowly than GDP. Zolotas argued that there would come a
time – as the quotation at the beginning of this appendix suggests – when an
increment of economic output would produce no increase in welfare at all.
In the concluding section, we shall return briefly to this hypothesis which appears, at
one level, to have been reinforced by the broadest set of studies to attempt to
construct an adjusted economic measure – the Daly and Cobb Index of Sustainable
Economic Welfare (ISEW).
The Daly and Cobb Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare
The ISEW was first developed for the United States for the years 1950 and 1988 by
Herman Daly and John Cobb and printed as an appendix to their landmark book For
the Common Good.109 A slightly revised version of the index, updated to 1990, was
published by Clifford Cobb and John Cobb in a collected volume of papers on the
Green National Product which also incorporated some early criticisms of the ISEW
methodology.110
Daly and Cobb’s aim was to develop an indicator capable of reflecting the range of
criticisms which had been directed at GDP as a welfare measure. They wanted, for
example, not only to incorporate a correction for the depreciation of natural and
human-made capital, but also to account for reduction of welfare associated with the
unequal distribution of incomes.111 They aimed to include the contribution to welfare
from the ‘informal’ economy,112 correct for the social and environmental costs of
production, and take account of so-called ‘defensive’ expenditures: ‘expenditures
necessary to defend ourselves from the unwanted side-effects of production’.113 As
Robert Kennedy’s Kansas speech pointed out, the GDP includes a variety of these
kinds of expenditures. An increasing proportion of the national income may be spent
on cleaning up environmental damage resulting from the production of goods and
services, or on treating illnesses arising from impaired environmental quality or social
degradation. These ‘defensive expenditures’ may be vital to maintain our quality of
life against the adverse welfare impacts of other expenditures. But it is surely then
inappropriate to count both sets of expenditures as positive contributions to welfare.
The Daly and Cobb ISEW starts out from the standard economic measure of private
consumer expenditure or ‘personal consumption’. For various reasons, many of
which are discussed elsewhere,114 this measure may not in itself provide an
unassailable basis from which to account for welfare in the nation. Nevertheless, it is
clear that personal consumption provides some indicator of the amount of money
which consumers are willing to pay for (and hence the value they assign to) the
goods and services through which welfare may be provided.
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Genuine progress and beyond
Since the publication of the original US ISEW, several similar studies have been
carried out in the US and elsewhere. Many of these studies incorporated additions or
revisions to the original methodology. One of the less significant but potentially more
confusing revisions of the ISEW has been a kind of ‘rebranding’ of the original idea.
In 1995, Clifford Cobb and his colleagues at an organisation called Redefining
Progress decided that the terminology of ISEW was not particularly attractive to most
people and published an index – based substantially on the ISEW methodology –
called the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI).115 The idea of the ‘rebranding’ was to
have a shorter, more accessible acronym, which specifically identified the index as a
better indicator of national progress than the GDP.
The GPI also introduced certain factors that had been left out of the original ISEW,
including adjustments for social costs such as crime, divorce and unemployment – all
recognised as factors affecting the level of well-being in the nation. Some later
versions of the ISEW or GPI have extended this set of factors to include the
psychological and social costs associated with under- and over-employment.116
In 2004, nef published an updated ISEW variant for the UK which was again re-
branded, this time as a Measure of Domestic Progress – MDP117,118 (Figure 5). One
of the aims of this work was to cast the green GDP more specifically as a useful way
of measuring a country’s progress towards sustainable development. The various
components of the index were related explicitly to the different dimensions of
sustainability: economic, social and environmental. It is this ISEW that the R-ISEW
presented in the body of this report is based upon.
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Appendix 2. The numbers
A.2.1 R-ISEW by region (£m 2005/06)
North East North West
Yorkshire &
Humber
East
Midlands
West
Midlands Eastern London South East South West England
1994 17,352 63,570 27,648 25,273 45,055 36,572 43,259 57,188 41,553 357,188
1995 18,600 64,097 29,208 28,037 45,790 36,717 48,714 57,789 43,233 371,726
1996 19,677 67,118 32,003 27,076 47,559 42,913 49,210 63,093 45,166 393,026
1997 20,204 68,968 32,379 30,630 46,389 38,964 53,953 63,741 47,007 401,637
1998 20,839 68,027 33,628 31,215 48,146 43,068 54,312 68,275 47,356 414,441
1999 21,495 70,108 34,997 33,775 48,747 47,151 63,542 68,078 50,010 436,638
2000 21,151 72,129 36,219 33,640 49,163 45,642 61,238 71,833 51,688 442,242
2001 22,822 75,356 37,134 36,954 50,560 45,746 70,890 76,598 53,684 469,595
2002 23,098 77,296 40,107 37,542 51,061 49,896 80,663 81,613 58,593 499,231
2003 23,710 80,125 44,404 38,435 54,160 50,907 81,263 78,516 62,894 513,836
2004 24,149 81,547 47,317 41,860 55,502 53,301 82,348 80,798 64,685 531,471
2005 24,466 81,706 46,763 43,127 54,759 54,457 87,756 82,072 63,833 538,697
A.2.1 R-ISEW per capita by region (£ 2005/06)
North East North West
Yorkshire &
Humber
East
Midlands
West
Midlands Eastern London South East South West England
1994 6,702 9,295 5,574 6,207 8,584 7,063 6,293 7,415 8,735 7,406
1995 7,201 9,387 5,888 6,852 8,710 7,053 7,047 7,444 9,041 7,683
1996 7,639 9,856 6,451 6,591 9,036 8,200 7,056 8,089 9,423 8,101
1997 7,868 10,151 6,531 7,434 8,816 7,398 7,691 8,117 9,738 8,253
1998 8,137 10,016 6,783 7,553 9,134 8,123 7,687 8,654 9,766 8,489
1999 8,429 10,351 7,062 8,135 9,246 8,831 8,882 8,558 10,246 8,905
2000 8,317 10,648 7,304 8,071 9,329 8,492 8,462 8,989 10,512 8,982
2001 8,985 11,126 7,461 8,820 9,574 8,472 9,682 9,547 10,861 9,497
2002 9,101 11,396 8,033 8,890 9,627 9,203 10,943 10,146 11,794 10,056
2003 9,338 11,774 8,865 9,039 10,181 9,319 10,999 9,717 12,581 10,307
2004 9,489 11,945 9,390 9,780 10,405 9,707 11,085 9,963 12,839 10,610
2005 9,564 11,935 9,234 10,016 10,207 9,826 11,673 10,053 12,595 10,682
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Appendix 3. Impact analysis of recent changes to
methodology
The headline results of the regional R-ISEWs in this report differ to varying degrees
from those calculated over the last two years for some regions. In the South East for
instance, the difference is quite small, ranging from minus 3% in 2004 to plus 10% in
2002. In the East Midlands, it is a little more significant: ranging from 7% in 2001 to
20% in 1997.
The reasons for this are twofold: first, there have been a number of revisions to the
methodology, including the addition of new costs and benefits; and secondly,
because some of the underlying datasets are subject to annual revision.
Three new components have been added in this version of the R-ISEW: the loss of
leisure time due to commuting; industrial accidents; and pollution abatement.
Between them, these new components add around 10–15% to the costs deducted
from the R-ISEW.
Against this, we now include all public expenditure on education as a social benefit,
including primary and secondary (these were excluded from previous R-ISEWs as
defensive costs); and we exclude the personal pollution control costs. The latter
reduces costs by only 1–2%, but the additional public expenditure adds up to 50% to
this component, and raises the headline R-ISEW by up to 10%. We also update the
unit valuation of domestic labour and volunteering to a constant 2005 rate for UK
domestic services; this adds up to another 10% in the earlier years of the study.
In the resource depletion component, we have improved estimations of transport fuel
use and energy use in services. Revisions to the GVA datasets used in the
calculations also affect the results here, particularly in industrial energy use. For long-
term environmental damage, we have better estimates of methane emissions which
also increase costs (methane is one of the most powerful greenhouse gases, so any
increase in emissions translates into a much larger difference in overall costs).
Between them, these two components increase the headline R-ISEW by up to 8%,
though this varies between regions depending on the absolute level of costs in these
categories.
In measuring income inequality, we now have access to better data which removes a
lot of estimation from the calculations; the effect of this is not huge – around plus or
minus 3–4%, but the magnitude and direction varies between regions, making the
rise in inequality less pronounced in some regions, and more so in others.
Finally, two of the components which experience the greatest differences are the
ever-volatile net capital growth and net international position. Here we have
introduced only minor revisions to methodology to replace some extrapolated figures
with new data. The changes seen here are in large part due to changes in the
underlying datasets: regional estimations of GVA and the Pink Book balance of
payments data are periodically revised. Although the changes in those datasets may
not appear to be large as a proportion of the original values, these components are
all about changes at the margins, especially net capital growth. Apparently small
changes can significantly affect the R-ISEW calculations, especially when datasets
such as net capital expenditure and the various components of the balance of
payments are in themselves quite volatile.
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Appendix 4. Methods and data
A4.1 Overview
Most of the data used to construct the English Regions R-ISEW have been taken
from UK government statistics, often provided through the Office for National
Statistics (ONS). Since the mid-1990s, a growing range of statistical publications
have been broken down at the level of the Government Office Regions (GOR). The
GORs only exist in England, but datasets sometimes also include parallel data from
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. They also sometimes include a UK
comparator.
Regional data prior to the mid-1990s is patchy at best and makes it difficult to
construct a regional index with an acceptable degree of robustness. For the purposes
of this exercise we have therefore adopted the time period from 1994 to 2005 as the
object of study. This time-series still involves some regression or interpolation where
datasets begin later than 1994. It has also sometimes involved some forecasting, as
the most recent data are sometimes from 2004. But trend estimations are limited to
the minimum possible, and remain within the bounds of confidence in this context.
The compilation and use of regional datasets is a comparatively new field and is still
subject to difficulties (the ONS often postpones publication of its regional GVA
estimates because of uncertainty over the data). It is assumed, however, that the
quality and range of regional data will continue to improve as the compilation
techniques and sources mature, so that the ability to construct the R-ISEW will only
strengthen over the coming years.
A continuing source of uncertainty in constructing an R-ISEW is the difficulty of
assigning monetary values to social and environmental factors. Monetary estimations
can involve assumptions or value judgements which may be difficult to justify on any
concrete first principles – for instance, climate change science is still in its infancy
and there are simply no definitive answers to the question of how much climate
change will ‘cost’. Indeed, we continue to rely on the best estimates laid down in a
joint Treasury/Defra report from 2002, although the recent Stern Report on the
economics of climate change suggests that these may need to be revised.
Unfortunately, due to some opacity in the report as to how their cost models work, we
have not been able to incorporate any new values into the R-ISEW at this point.
In such instances we have chosen to use, as far as possible, the most widely
accepted or defensible values.
The following sections describe in some detail the assumptions, data sources and
methods employed to calculate the individual components of the R-ISEW. All prices
have been converted to constant £2005/2006 using the GDP deflator series from HM
Treasury.
The last section of this appendix is a brief note on the relation between the R-ISEWs
for the regions, and the R-ISEW for the whole of England.
A4.2 Economic factors
Consumer expenditure
The initial basis for the index is personal consumption – final household expenditure
– as this is an indicator of the value which individuals assign to the goods and
services through which welfare is provided. At the UK level, these data are taken
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from the UK National Accounts Blue Book119 datasets. To derive regional figures we
used household expenditure data from the Expenditure and Food Survey (formerly
the Family Expenditure Survey)120 as a proxy.
Regional household expenditure data are provided as the weekly average spend per
household. Data exist only from 1994–2004, so figures for 2005 are estimated from
1994–2004 trends. Combining these data with population data (from ONS population
estimates)121 and the average number of people per household (also given in the
FES/EFS), gives an estimate of total consumer expenditure for each region. We
perform the same calculations for the UK spending data and then divide the regional
figure by the national to show the region's household expenditure as a proportion of
the UK total. This ratio is then applied to the UK Blue Book data to give an estimation
of total regional personal consumption.
Net capital growth
Capital formation needs to be offset against growth in the labour market, if we
assume an equal amount of capital per worker is necessary to maintain productivity.
We use UK data on net capital stocks from the ONS National Accounts datasets,122
and derive regional estimates using regional data on net capital expenditure by
industry, which is reported in the Annual Business Inquiry.123 The net stock per
worker is calculated for each year, then multiplied by the change in the available
labour force (population of working age)124 in that year to derive a capital requirement
to maintain the status quo. The remaining capital formation is the net capital growth.
Regional data on net capital expenditure is available for the years 1998–2004. We
calculate the ratio of regional expenditure to UK expenditure for these years, and
then extrapolate the trend in this ratio to cover the whole time period. These
percentages are multiplied by the UK data on net capital stocks (excluding dwellings,
are these are not part of the production process) to give regional estimates. To
reduce sampling errors we take a rolling five-year average to derive the change in
stocks for each year.
This is multiplied by the change in the available labour force each year (also taken as
a rolling average) to give the benchmark capital requirements for that year, then this
figure is subtracted from the capital growth to give net capital growth.
Net international position
The purpose of this component in national ISEW-type indicators is to assess whether
the country is maintaining a sustainable balance of payments or is running up
international debt. At the subnational level, this does not hold in the same way,
because it is impossible to obtain sufficiently detailed data to treat any region as a
trading bloc in its own right, and establish ‘imports and exports’ to other regions as
well as outside the UK. However, it is useful to show how each region contributes to
the UK's net international position rather than simply omitting it.
To do this, we start with UK balance of payments data taken from the ONS's
Economic Trends datasets,125 and derive regional estimates using GVA and data on
regional imports and exports as a share of the UK total. The import/export data was
sourced from HM Revenue and Customs' regional trade statistics for 1996–2005,126
and extrapolated from the trends to 1994–1995.
The balance of payments data are broken down into imports, exports, and income
and current account transfers. We multiply the UK import and export figures for each
year by the relevant regional percentages of UK imports/exports. We use these
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percentages calculated from the HM Revenue and Customs data rather than using
the reported data, because these latter only count imports and exports of goods, not
goods and services. We cannot assume that the percentage of UK trade in services
is the same as that in goods, so we use regional consumer expenditure as a proxy
for the imports of services; and regional GVA in private services as a proxy for
service exports.
To estimate the regional share of income and current account transfers we use
regional GVA as a proxy. The resulting three figures are summed to give a total for
each year which represents the ‘net international position’ of each region. A rolling
average is used, as this dataset is prone to sharp swings which can have a
disproportionate effect on the overall R-ISEW.
Services from consumer durables
Expenditure on durable goods is included in the personal consumption data, but this
in itself does not accurately reflect the welfare contribution of durable goods, because
this may be enjoyed over the period of several years rather than just this year's
accounting period. To adjust for this, we calculate the difference between
expenditure on consumer durables and the service flows from the net stock of
durables in each year, and subtract this from top-line expenditure. These estimations
are problematic given the scarcity of estimates of the net stock of durables, and
service flows from that stock.
The most recent estimates of the stocks and flows of consumer durables in the UK
are in a 1997 paper,127 and give estimates from 1948 to 1995. In previous R-ISEW
calculations we had simply extrapolated from there, but as those estimates age and
the time period under study moves forward, this approach becomes increasingly
indefensible. Instead, we adopt a simplified model to estimates stocks from durables
expenditure: we assume an average eight-year lifespan for all durables with linear
depreciation, so a given purchase will lose 1/8 of its value each year, and be retired
from the stock after 8 years. In any given year then, we calculate the net value of
stocks to be the full amount of expenditure in that year, plus 7/8 of the previous
year's expenditure, 6/8 of the year before that … and so on.
We then estimate annual service flows as 1/8 of the net stocks in that year, plus an
additional proportion of the stock to account for the interest foregone. In this we
follow the established methodology for treating consumer durables as household
capital – in choosing to invest in durable goods which provide an ongoing flow of
services instead of putting the money in the bank, the consumer implicitly values that
good at the purchase price plus the interest foregone in making the
purchase.128,129,130 The interest rate used in the calculation is the average Bank of
England base rate over the period of the study.
A4.3 Social factors
Household labour and volunteering
The value of services from domestic labour and volunteering are added to the index,
as this is a major source of productive value which goes uncounted in conventional
economic measures. Valuing an hour of household labour and volunteering is
problematic: we use an UK average wage for domestic staff (source: ASHE131). This
hourly wage is then applied to time use data from the ONS's UK Time Use Survey of
2000 132 and its pilot study in 1995.133
Time-use data are sporadic and subject to many uncertainties involving the coding of
time slots, especially where the coding is done directly by the individuals surveyed
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rather than via interview with survey staff. Categories are not always directly
comparable between different surveys, and the margin of error due to sample size in
the earlier survey is quite large.
In this version of the R-ISEW we therefore discard much of the older, reported time-
use data we had been relying on, and have gone back to the raw time-use data from
the more recent and reliable ONS surveys. Where the data appear to conflict
(particularly where we are looking at regional rather than national figures), we look to
the more comprehensive 2000 data. We filter out any respondents not in the 16–
60/64 age bracket, as domestic labour is conventionally calculated only on the basis
of people who could be economically active.
The mean minutes per activity, per day, per person are converted to hours per year
and scaled up using the regional population of working age, to give a total figure for
domestic labour and volunteering person-hours for the region. This is then valued
using a constant wage rate: we use the UK average wage in 2001 (the mid-point of
the study) in the category ‘domestic staff and related occupations’.
Public expenditure on health and education
There is some debate in the literature over the way to treat public expenditure –
whether some proportion should be considered defensive spending which does not
actually contribute to welfare. Rather than deeming an arbitrary proportion of
expenditure to be defensive, we consider all expenditure on health and education to
be a non-defensive benefit. In this model, defensive expenditure on health is
subtracted elsewhere in the index, for instance by counting the health costs of crime,
car accidents and atmospheric pollution, and all education is deemed a social
benefit.
This is a change from previous versions of the R-ISEW, where we still followed the
spirit of the early ISEWs in deeming a proportion of education expenditure as
‘defensive’ on the grounds that it is necessary merely to maintain a country or
region's competitiveness, but this seems too limited an interpretation of education.
The data for this component are taken from the Treasury's Public Expenditure
Statistical Analyses (PESA) datasets.134 Data are available at UK level for all years,
but only from 1996 at GOR level. For the years 1994–1995, we back-cast from 1996
using the UK trends.
Effects of income distribution
The measure used to determine the costs of unequal income distribution is the
Atkinson Index. This has the advantage over other inequality measures of containing
an explicit variable epsilon (ε) which represents the degree of aversion to inequality.
Income inequality is usually measured using net income after tax and benefits in
order to capture redistributive effects. In previous versions of the R-ISEW, we began
with gross weekly pay from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE),135
estimated the means in each income decile from there, and then corrected for the
effects of tax and benefits following UK trends.
This involved more assumptions and stages of estimation than we would like to have,
but given limited resources at the time, it was the best estimation possible. In this
version we go back to the raw data on household income after tax and benefits from
the Family Resources Survey. This is equivalised for household composition using
the McClements factors (because a couple living on X pounds per week are relatively
better off than a family of four living on the same X pounds per week).
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The Atkinson Index requires mean incomes in each group, so we order the
households into income bands for each region (and for England and the UK as a
whole), and take the mean of each band for each year. The Atkinson Index is then
calculated using the following equation:
I = 1–(∑(Yi/Y(1–ε) x Pi))1/(1–ε)
where Yi is the average income in the ith group of the income population, Y is the
average income in the whole income population, Pi is the proportion of the income
population in the ith group, and e is the aversion to inequality.
A value of ε of 0.8 is generally used as the norm in the literature, though acceptable
values range from -0.5 (indicating a preference for some inequality) to 2.5 (strongly
anti-inequality).
The resulting values are then multiplied by the consumer expenditure figures to give
the social cost of inequality: this cost is subtracted from the original consumer
expenditure to give income-adjusted personal consumption.
Costs of crime
Data for this component come from various sources, principally the Home Office
136,137, but also the Department of Transport for some vehicle-related theft data.138
These all give the numbers of reported crimes in various categories; there are some
disjunctures in the data where offence categories change, and also where certain
offences (e.g. common assault) become notifiable. No attempt has been made to
adjust for these disjunctures as there seems to be no defensible method for doing so;
and because the effects are not large. Data on most costs come from a report from
the Home Office research department which gives estimates of the economic and
social costs of crime. This report was updated in 2003–2004,139 and we use the costs
from there. Other cost data related to commercial victims of crime come from the
Home Office's Commercial Victimisation Survey from 2002.140
The costs of crime estimated by the Home Office are broken down into categories,
some of which are not included in the R-ISEW. Health service costs are included,
because we are including public health expenditure as a benefit elsewhere in the
index; victim services and legal costs are not, because the public expenditure on
these services is not included in the index to begin with. These are therefore
removed from the cost for each category of crime to give an average allowable cost
per incident before combining this with the numbers of incidents.
In addition to the preventative cost components estimated by the Home Office report,
we also have data on the average defensive expenditure by businesses against
crime. To simply include this in its entirety would be to double-count some costs, but
it is appropriate to include some of it. Commercial properties require greater
expenditure per incident to protect against crimes such as theft (they are larger, more
likely to be empty of people but full of valuable goods, and in business districts there
are no neighbours to watch over them). They also have to spend money to protect
themselves against fraud and forgery, which is not covered in the Home Office costs.
To ensure we have made some accounting for these factors, we take 50% of the
average crime prevention expenditure per business, and multiply it by the number of
VAT-registered businesses in the region.
61
Costs of family breakdown
Divorce statistics (numbers of divorces granted per year) were supplied by HM
Courts Service.141 Estimating the unit cost of divorce is problematic, as it is extremely
multifaceted. Some aspects are covered by other components of the ISEW: for
instance, lost output will be reflected in lower consumer expenditure. But the true
costs also include the emotional impact on divorcees and their families, greater
pressure on housing stock and thus rising prices, ‘unnecessary’ consumption (a
married couple only needs one kettle but a divorced couple needs two), as well as
the arguable and almost certainly unquantifiable effects on social cohesion in
general.
We identify two kinds of cost in this category: direct defensive costs (legal fees,
maintenance payments, setting up a new home, etc) and costs due to the increased
risk of mortality (many studies have shown a correlation between family breakdown
and shortened lifespan).
To estimate defensive costs, we take the results of two surveys carried out by the
insurance industry, which put the total UK cost of divorce at approximately £2 billion
in 2003 and £2.5 billion in 2006. We divide each of these by the number of UK
divorces in those years and use the average of the two as our unit cost per divorce.
The second kind of costs are based on an American study of 180,000 men and
women aged 45–64,142 which assessed the change in risk of mortality following
divorce, and applying these risks to the median value of a standard statistical life.
Costs of commuting
In line with some other ISEWs, we now account for the loss of leisure time as well as
the direct costs of commuting (motoring expenses and public transport fares). The
unit value of an hour's commuting time is based on research from the Department of
Transport,143 which estimates the mean perceived value of commuting time in 2002
at £5.04 per hour in current prices, and that this varies with income with an elasticity
of 0.8. This can be used to estimate valuation costs for other years by using the
mean hourly wage for each year from ASHE. The time spent commuting is available
at regional level in the Department for Transport's (DfT’s)Regional Transport
Statistics,144 so the two are combined to give regional total costs.
To estimate direct costs we rely on travel data from the DfT's National Travel
Survey145 and its Regional Transport Statistics,146 and expenditure data from the
FES/EFS.147 The travel data are used to calculate what proportion of travel via three
main types of transport (private motor vehicle, bus/coach and rail/tube) is due to
commuting, and then we take that proportion of the relevant household expenditure
as the cost.
The ideal travel data would give distances travelled due to commuting and other
purposes, so that we can calculate the number of passenger-kilometres due to
commuting. Unfortunately this is not available at the regional level, or even
consistently at the national level. At the regional level, we have the number of
commuting and other trips, but this does not take into account the fact that most
commuting trips are longer than most shopping trips. To assign a fair proportion of
travel costs to commuting, we really need to work off distance rather than number.
To do this, we take the national data on distance travelled and modes of transport,
and interpolate as necessary to give a full time-series. We then compare these to the
national data on the number of trips, and establish a relationship between them. This
is then applied to the regional data on number of trips by each mode of transport to
estimate regional distances travelled due to commuting.
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Finally, we take household expenditure on these three modes of travel (including
motor insurance in the private vehicle category) from the FES/EFS.148 The totals for
each mode of travel are then multiplied by the proportion of travel due to commuting,
and then again by the appropriate proportion of commuting by that mode of transport
to give an estimate of the total costs of commuting for each; these are then summed
to give an overall cost.
Note that the motoring costs are adjusted to account for the proportion of people who
commute as driver and those who are a passenger (we only want to count motoring
costs once per car, rather than per person). Finally, we use the survey sample
metadata (number of people per household) and regional population data to translate
this weekly household expenditure into a regional total per year.
Costs of car accidents
The data for this component is sourced from the DfT's Regional Transport
Statistics,149 but also from the ONS's Annual Abstract of Statistics.150 Costs are taken
from a briefing paper the DfT published in 2003.151 This paper gives an average cost
per incident in the four categories of accident for which statistics are commonly
reported: accidents involving damage to vehicles and property only; accidents
producing slight injury; accidents producing serious injuries; and accidents producing
fatalities.
Accidents which resulted in serious injury or death are bracketed into a single KSI
(Killed or Seriously Injured) category at the regional level. Costs are substantially
different for serious injury and for death, however, so we estimate a breakdown of
this figure at the regional level using the average split at the UK level for 1994–2004.
The costs given in the DfT's briefing paper are broken down into categories; following
the reasoning outlined in the comments on the costs of crime outlined above, we
include medical and ambulance costs but exclude police costs.
Costs of industrial accidents
We have some regional data from the Health and Safety Executive on the costs to
employers of injury, and we also have some UK estimates of overall costs – i.e.
including the costs to individuals and society as well as to employers. These costs
are from 2001. We also have some unit costs of injuries in different sectors, from
which we derive two weighted mean costs per injury (‘serious or major’ and ‘over 3
days’). For fatal injuries we assume the same unit cost as for car accidents.
We then have incidence rates for 2001 to 2005; using these with the unit costs we
estimate interim costs per region for those years. We do not use these costs directly,
because they do not tally with the totals as reported from 2001; rather, we index
these figures on 2001 (and extrapolate back to 1994), and use this index with the
reported 2001 costs to give consistent cost estimates for each year.
The costs of illness due to work are not included in these analyses.
A4.4 Environmental factors
Costs of air pollution
The National Air Emissions Inventory (NAEI) maintains a time-series database of
certain pollutants in the UK,152 the most recent of which are for 2004 and are
available at a granularity of 1km x 1km across the country; previous years are
available at the national level only. We use the regional data from 2004 to estimate
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regional emissions for previous years, applying the 2004 proportions of the UK totals
to the national data for each year. Emissions measured in this way are: carbon
monoxide, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, sulphur dioxides, particulate
matter smaller than 10 micrometres (PM-10s), volatile organic compounds (VOCs),
lead, benzene, and 1,3-butadeine.
Of these, we have sourced estimates of the social/environmental costs per tonne for
all but lead, benzene and 1,3-butadeine, which are therefore omitted from the air
pollution costs in the ISEW. Carbon dioxide and methane are not used in this
component but are costed in the long-term environmental damage component
instead. Nitrous oxide is also costed for its climate change effects in that component,
but the immediate pollution effects of all oxides of nitrogen are costed and used in
this component. Unit costs are taken from a number of sources153,154 and averaged to
derive plausible working values.
The NAEI database can be interrogated by local authority area to produce results for
each 1km2 in each authority: these were then summed to give regional totals for each
pollutant. Total emissions are multiplied by the cost per tonne for the selected
pollutants, and these are summed to give an overall total cost.
Costs of water pollution
The Environment Agency gives data155 on chemical and biological quality of a given
stretch of river; the results are given separately, as the percentage of total river
length which falls into each category. We take the average of the chemical and
biological quality as a measure of overall quality.
A Defra paper published in 1999 looked at possible policy measures to control
pollution.156 This estimated the benefits associated with bringing a stretch of river up
from one quality grade to another, which we use in conjunction with the Environment
Agency data. The target quality of all lengths of river is set at ‘good’.
The costs estimated by Defra for a change in river quality are based on a model
which has four scenarios and thus four sets of costs: (i) low density population,
agricultural; (ii) high density population, agricultural; (iii) clean industry and (iv)
traditional industry. We take an average of the costs given by the scenarios which
best characterise each region. The costs are only calculated for improving a stretch
of river by a single quality grade, so we derive the necessary additional figures from
these to be able to cost the improvement from the worst grade to the best.
The costs give are per kilometre of river: for each category below the target quality of
‘good’, we derive the cumulative cost of bringing 1km up to the target standard, and
then multiply those costs by the lengths of river in each subtarget category.
Given the lack of overlap between the regions defined by the Environment Agency
and the GORs, one should not be surprised to see that the sum of the costs of water
pollution for all regions does not come to the same figure as the total cost of water
pollution for England for any given year. Section A4.5 in this appendix investigates
this discrepancy in more detail.
Costs of pollution abatement
Defra provides current and capital expenditure per employee in different industry
sectors for 2001–2004. We annuitise the capital costs over ten years with an interest
rate of 5%, and extrapolate for the remaining years in the period. We then use
employment data from the Labour Force Survey to get total number of employees in
64
each sector for each region. These figures are combined with the unit costs and
summed across all sectors to give total costs for each region.
Costs of noise pollution
Whereas in the past we have restricted the noise pollution costs to road traffic, we
now also include aviation noise. Estimates of the total cost of road traffic noise in the
UK were sourced from three studies,157,158,159 which all yielded similar results. We
take the average of these, which is approximately £2.9 billion in 1993. We then use
data on vehicle-kilometres per region from the DfT's Regional Transport Statistics to
apportion an appropriate amount to each region.
Aviation noise is costed using two sources. First is an estimate of the total noise
pollution costs of activity in and out of Heathrow airport,160 which is combined with the
number of Heathrow flights from the Civil Aviation Authority161 to give a cost per flight
of about £90. We also refer to a document from HM Treasury which estimates the
noise pollution cost per flight at rural airports is about 1/8 of the cost at Heathrow
(because less people are affected by it).
Then we estimate what proportion of flights in each region going to and from rural
and urban or semi-urban airports, by looking at the 20 busiest airports in the country,
and their surroundings. For instance, in the North East, around 80% of flights are to
or from the semi-urban airport of Newcastle, while 20% go to the rural Teesside
airport. Using these breakdowns with data on the total number of flights per region,
we can estimate the costs from aviation noise in each region.
Costs of loss of natural habitats
To value the loss of natural habitats, we use a willingness-to-pay model to estimate a
cost per hectare: data from the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in
three separate purchases of wetlands for conservation values a hectare of wetland at
between £3,093 and £6,373 (at 2005/06 prices). These figures agree with a study
from 1994 giving a range of WTP values from £1,529 to£5,703 per ha.
As natural habitats should be considered a capital stock which we have been
depleting for some time without accounting for it, a cumulative model is appropriate
here. The actual data on habitat loss are not available for all years: UK data were
estimated from several sources for the MDP 2002,162 but regional data are only
available for 1990 and 1998 in the Countryside Survey (CS 2000).163 We use this
together with various estimates of wetlands loss in the UK and northern Europe164 to
extrapolate back to a starting point of 1930, assuming a constant proportional loss of
1.3% per year. The cumulative total loss since 1930 is calculated for each year and
multiplied by the cost per hectare.
Costs of loss of farmlands
The loss of farmlands is costed using two components: first, soil erosion and loss of
productivity due to intensive agriculture and secondly, loss of land actually given over
to agriculture. We take the UK MDP165,166 estimates of both costs and scale to the
regional level using the area of land under agriculture as a proxy. Data for land use
are taken from the CS 2000,167 the Eurostat regional statistics database168 and
Defra's June Agricultural Census.169 These sources have some gaps over the period
which require interpolation of data points.
To estimate soil erosion costs, we use the UK MDP estimates of UK annual
productivity loss and the cumulative loss at 1950, and scale them down to the
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regional level using the ratio of area of land under agriculture in each region to that in
the UK. We then multiply this by the total area of land under agriculture in each
region to get a cost of soil erosion for each year, and accumulate it.
In an improvement on previous R-ISEWs, we have sourced concrete figures for the
amount of land under agriculture in each region in 1950; these starting points were
previously estimated using an assumed annual rate of loss. Again using the UK MDP
unit costs, we calculate the cumulative cost of the loss of farmlands for each region.
Finally, the soil erosion and loss of farmland costs are combined to give a single total
cost for each year.
Long-term environmental damage
The data sources and methodology for this component are almost identical to those
for the air pollution component described above.170,171 Regional data for methane and
nitrous oxide are not available. We derive estimates for methane based on three
proxies, each representing one of the major sources of methane. For energy
production, we use sulphur dioxide emissions as a proxy, because over 90% of SO2
emissions are from energy production. For enteric fermentation we use livestock
numbers from the June Agricultural Census, and for waste, we use population (direct
waste data is only available for the last 2–3 years). The relative proportions of each
of these sources in each year are sourced from the UK's 2005 submission to the
IPCC.172
For nitrous oxide we use all oxides of nitrogen as a proxy. Estimates for the social
and environmental cost of atmospheric carbon are taken from the same RCEP study.
Costs for methane and nitrous oxides are based on this cost plus information from
the NAEI Greenhouse Gas Inventories reports173 which estimates the Global
Warming Potential (GWP) of these gases as a multiple of the effect of carbon
dioxide.
Total emissions of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxides are calculated as for
air pollution described above. We multiply the methane emissions by 21 and the
nitrous oxide emissions by 310 to give their GWP in terms of tonnes of carbon
dioxide, and then by 12/44 to derive the carbon equivalent. These figures are then
summed to give total GHG emissions in GWP tCe.
For unit costs, we use the estimates from a Defra/HM Treasury report in 2002, which
studied the available literature at the time and provided a range of defensible values
for the social cost of carbon. These ranged from £35/tCe to £140/tCe, with a
recommended working value of £70/tCe.
The recent Stern Review of climate change economics may well lead to a re-
evaluation of these costs, but unfortunately we have not been able to do this in this
report. Climate change cost models are varied and complex, and the Stern Review
gives rather limited information on the models it uses. Extracting the necessary
information will take more time and resources than we have been able to commit to
this project. It is unlikely, however, that our central estimate will be rendered
completely redundant, and as it is towards the lower end of the range of possible
values, we are at least erring towards a conservative cost estimate, and away from
hyperbole.
The estimated cost per tonne of carbon is a marginal social cost, so we can calculate
the marginal cost each year very simply. However, this does not reflect the true
cumulative cost of emissions past, present and future, nor does it make good sense
in accounting terms, since the damage done by each tonne emitted takes place over
its lifetime in the atmosphere (around 100 years), and the cost is not truly borne until
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sometime in the future. The most accurate way to account for this would be to use
the damage function which yielded the original cost estimate to plan payments into a
kind of climate change insurance fund. This fund would ensure that sufficient money
was available to cover the costs as and when they become due.
This is problematic however: the damage functions are not given explicitly in the
literature, and although it is likely that they can be sourced given time, there will still
be an issue over what kind of insurance instrument is most appropriate to each.
Under the circumstances we have assumed a simplistic model, under which the full
cost of each tonne of carbon becomes due in 2050. This allows us to calculate the
amount required to offset damage at that point, and therefore what annual payments
into an ‘endowment fund’ would be required to ensure that sufficient funds are
available then.
The value in 2050 of the marginal cost each year is calculated using the same
discount rate used in the study which derived the cost estimate. This cost is
accumulated each year, and the resulting amount is used to calculate the annual
payments required into an endowment fund which matures in 2050, given a constant
interest rate. This interest rate is an assumption which reflects risk aversion, and can
be varied between 0% and 3% for sensitivity analysis. We use 0%: as discussed
above, our unit cost is relatively low, so it seems prudent to be as risk-averse as
possible when projecting the growth of our hypothetical fund.
Depletion of non-renewable resources
This column calculates the costs associated with replacing fossil energy used in the
region with renewable energy, in line with the replacement cost methodology
proposed first proposed by Cobb and Cobb in the revised US ISEW. Regional data
on energy usage are extremely scarce.
However, national data are strong and available from the UK Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) in a variety of forms including a breakdown by sector, including
details of energy use by different modes of transport.174 This allows us to choose
suitable proxies for regional estimates, specifically GVA (industrial component) for
industry usage; GVA in private and public services for these two components;
population for domestic energy use; and travel data for the energy use in each mode
of transport. GVA figures are taken from the ONS's regional datasets,175 population
from its Population Trends datasets,176 and transport data from the DfT's Regional
Transport Statistics.
The resulting energy usage is converted to barrel of oil equivalents oil (at 7.315
barrels per tonne) and then cashed out using a replacement value per barrel. This
unit cost is an average of the recent (2005) crude oil peak price of US$60/bbl177 and
a cost derived from the US Green National Product (Cobb & Cobb) estimate of
$75/bbl178 (in 1988: this is increased using an escalation factor of 2% per year). The
crude oil price underestimates the true costs of replacing fossil fuels with renewable
resources; the Cobb and Cobb figure is probably an overestimate now, as the cost of
renewables has come down in recent years due to improvements in technology. An
average of the two gives a defensible estimate.
A4.5 The whole versus the sum of the parts
Readers should note that for some components the sum of the figures for the nine
regions does not exactly match the total figure for England. In the case of resource
depletion, this is due to rounding in the regional domestic energy use data; in others
it is due to the limitations of the data available.
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For consumer durables and for commuting, the discrepancy is an artefact of how the
household expenditure data was used. Mean figures for household expenditure are
available both at the regional level and for the whole of England. To calculate, for
example, total consumer durables expenditure for a given region, we took the mean
for a household in that region, divided it by the mean number of people per
household for that region (according to the same data set) and multiplied it by the
population for that region (from Population Trends).
The sum of all these regional totals does not equal the figure calculated in the same
way for the whole of England. This is due to slight discrepancies between the
distribution of the sample across regions in the household expenditure survey and
the population distribution across regions in Population Trends. For example, in
2000, Population Trends estimates 83.6% of the population of the UK to be living in
England. However, only 77.8% of the household expenditure survey’s sample is from
England. Such differences inevitably lead to slight differences in the totals calculated
across the nine regions.
For water pollution, the problem is more convoluted. First, lengths of river in each
region are only estimates – and it appears that the estimates available in regional
trends do not add up to the total length of river in England. Even if this is adjusted for,
however, the regional figures still don’t add up to the total for England, primarily due
to our use of different usage scenarios to estimate costs for each region, but also
because the figures for the percentages of rivers in each region that are of different
qualities do not quite align. For our purposes, the biggest problem is the lack of fit
between the GORs and the Environment Agency regions, meaning that attributing
the costs of pollution in one Environment Agency region to the appropriate GORs is
in some cases only a rough approximation.
Fortunately, none of these differences makes much difference to the ISEW. Across
the years 1994–2005, the mean absolute difference between the figures calculated
by summing the regions and those calculated directly for the whole of England is
0.8% for the consumer durables column and 1.0% for the costs of commuting. The
only column where there is a marked discrepancy is for water pollution where the
sum of the regions undershoots the England total by an average of 14.4% across the
12 years in question. However, the water pollution column represents a tiny fraction
of the ISEW, and the mean absolute difference (£53 million per year) represents a
mere 0.01% of the total ISEW for England for any given year. Indeed, taking the
ISEW as a whole, all three discrepancies make a marginal difference – on average
the sum of the regions overshooting the England total figure by only 0.1%. The
graphs below show the difference (or rather ‘lack of’) between the sums and the
England totals for all three columns and for the total ISEW.
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Costs of Water Pollution
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Figure 32: Discrepancy between sum of regions and England total:
water pollution.
Consumer Durables column
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Figure 33: Discrepancy between sum of regions and England total:
consumer durables.
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Costs of commuting
(indexed against 1994 figure for the whole of England)
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Figure 34: Discrepancy between sum of regions and England total:
costs of commuting.
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Figure 35: Discrepancy between sum of regions and England total:
R-ISEW.
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Appendix 5. Sensitivity analyses
As indicated throughout this report, the R-ISEW is sensitive to assumptions made
concerning a number of different parameters in the various environmental, social or
economic factors incorporated in the index. In this final appendix, we present briefly
sensitivity analyses based on changing parameters associated with the three
components which have the largest impact on the headline results, and which are
also affected by assumed costs. These are: i) the aversion to income inequality (ε); ii)
the replacement cost assumed for fossil resources; and iii) the assumed social cost
of carbon.
In each case we illustrate the impact of changing an assumption on the R-ISEW for
England. The impact on individual regions will vary according to the degree to which
their R-ISEW is dominated by each of these three factors. For instance, changes in
the social cost of carbon will affect Yorkshire and the Humber more than London;
while the reverse is true of changes in aversion to income inequality.
A5.1 Variations in the value of epsilon
Figure 36 illustrates the results first of all of varying ε between 0 (no aversion to
income inequality) and 1.6 (which lies well within the range of accepted values for
high aversion to income inequality). By completely removing aversion to income
inequality, the R-ISEW is increased by between 15% (in 2004) and 20% (in 2000).
Increasing the aversion to 1.6 depresses the index by between 13% and 15% (again,
in 2004 and 2000).
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Figure 36: English R-ISEW with variations in the value of epsilon (ε).
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A5.2 Variations in the escalation factor in resource depletion
The escalation factor used in the original Cobb and Cobb revised US ISEW was 3%
per annum. They justified this escalation factor on the grounds that a steadily
increasing cost would be expected as higher and higher levels of energy
consumption were met using renewable energy. At the margin, renewable energy
source might replace fossil quite cheaply, but for greater levels of penetration this
would no longer be the case. This escalation factor has its critics, and we concur that
the choice of factor is somewhat arbitrary.
However, we do believe that some escalation is justifiable: the UK is going to
struggle to meet its target of 10% of energy from renewable sources by 2010, so the
idea that we can simply choose to replace all fossil fuels with renewables at a
constant replacement cost seems far-fetched. As a concession to the critics, we have
adopted a lower escalation factor of 2%, but believe that even this is conservative.
We have also adopted a lower replacement cost per barrel than assumed by Daly
and Cobb (around £102/bbl in 2005/06 prices). In this sensitivity analysis, we
investigate the effect of range of replacement costs based on the higher Cobb and
Cobb estimate on the one hand and the September oil price peak (around £33 per
barrel) on the other.
Figure 37 illustrates the impact of this range on the R-ISEW. There is clearly some
variation in the R-ISEW as a result of this exercise with the higher per barrel
replacement cost leading to a very slight divergence between R-ISEW and GVA over
the period, by contrast with the central case.
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Figure 37: R-ISEW with variations in the energy replacement cost.
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A5.3 Variations in the social cost of carbon
The R-ISEW uses the Treasury estimate from 2002 of £70/tC as the social cost of
carbon for the year 2000. The Treasury document reports a range of estimates
however between £35/tC and £140/tC, with £70/tC as the central estimate. As
discussed earlier in this report, this working value may need to be updated after a
thorough analysis of the Stern Review.
However, it seems probable that the range of possible values will be similar to the
range we use now. So although we may want to revise the central estimate in line
with Stern at some point, a sensitivity analysis based on the 2002 Treasury estimates
should still hold true. Figure 38 illustrates the impact of choosing a social cost of
carbon at the two ends of this range. Clearly, the higher social cost of carbon has an
enormous depressive effect on the index, and the gap between R-ISEW and GVA
widens progressively over the study period by comparison with the central estimate.
The spread of results in this sensitivity analysis may raise concern over the
robustness of the whole R-ISEW, but given the huge uncertainties that surround the
issue of climate change (in particular how to cost it), such a divergence in possible
results is simply unavoidable. Under the circumstances, all anyone can do is to work
with the best estimates possible. In fact, the central estimate is very much towards
the conservative end of the scale. This is intended to counter any allegations of
hyperbole, but it should be noted that to follow the precautionary principle in practice
– when in doubt, assume the worst and err on the side of caution – we should adopt
a higher cost, which would result in a much lower R-ISEW.
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Figure 38: R-ISEW with variations in the social cost of carbon.
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